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2 descartes Conventional wisdom, like the early modern tale, holds René Descartes responsible for effecting a revolutionary break from the Scholastic tradition, particularly in the theory of ideas. Although he applied the term ‘‘idea’’ in a new way and built an innovative mechanistic theory of perception that capitalizes on this new use, it is not at all obvious that Descartes advanced a new and clear theory of the ontological status of ideas. We are, in the main, still in familiar conceptual territory. He tells Hobbes in the Third Replies that ‘‘I used the word ‘idea’ because it was the standard philosophical term used to refer to the forms of perception belonging to the divine mind, even though we recognize that God does not possess any corporeal imagination. And besides, there was not any more appropriate term at my disposal’’ (CSM I:127–28). Perhaps the main innovation accorded Descartes is that of shifting the application of the word ‘‘idea’’ from the contents of the divine mind to the human mind. It is worth noting that Descartes indicates he is using the word not in spite of its traditional use but because of it. Nicholas Jolley suggests that this is a clue that Descartes is ascribing some properties to the human mind that were formerly reserved for God (1990, 12). This move makes Descartes’ use of the word ‘‘idea’’ no less innovative but perhaps less unexpected. His Jesuit education at Le Flèche emphasized the Thomistic tradition, but he was exposed to a variety of important Scholastic luminaries including Ockham and Duns Scotus (Gaukroger 1995, esp. ch. 2). As a result, although he was to push a new theory of perception and was the first to use the word ‘‘idea’’ in the modern sense, Descartes’ musings are in many important respects Scholastic. Descartes’ official final view is that ideas are properly modes, but the details of this position turn out to be rather complex. Descartes gives us what many take to be the official definition of an idea in the Second Replies. 38 idea and ontology ‘‘I understand this term [idea] to mean the form of any given thought, immediate perception of which makes me aware of the thought’’ (CSM II:113). Importantly, however, he distinguishes between kinds (or rather aspects ) of ideas, and it has frequently been remarked that these divisions are crucial to understanding his general theory, since he often employs the different senses of idea without signaling that he is doing so (Chappell 1986, 177–78). Descartes appears to discuss not one but rather several distinctions that apply among ideas. He distinguishes between taking ideas formally and objectively, materially and formally, and finally materially and objectively (CSM II:27–28, 162–63, 7). The first is the main distinction, the second refers to an additional distinction within the context of material and formal falsity, and the last is simply a variant of the first. Nonetheless, Descartes’ use of terms makes his discussion in the Third Meditation occasionally difficult to unravel, as he fails to use the same language to describe the distinctions being invoked (CSM II:27–28). To further complicate matters, he uses the word ‘‘idea’’ to apply to corporeal images in his early works on perception. Despite the varying usages, the underlying distinction is a familiar one. Ideas taken materially (or often, formally) are modes of the mind, and this generally refers to the ontic status of ideas. Ideas taken objectively (or more rarely, formally) indicates their representative content. In accordance with standard use, I shall refer to ideas taken materially as ideasm, and ideas taken objectively as ideaso. The material/objective distinction, because not a ‘‘real’’ distinction in the Cartesian world, makes this bit of philosophy more difficult to penetrate. Descartes tells us that the material and objective aspects differ only by a distinction of reason. Thus when talking about an idea (the form of a thought) materially and objectively, there are not two entities. Rather there is but one thing, about which we speak in two different ways. Descartes is notoriously vague on this point (see, e.g., Chappell 1986, 193–94). As a rule, he treats ideaso as the contents of ideasm. Most scholars are tempted to hold that ideas, strictly speaking, are modes, but Descartes sometimes confusedly speaks (as do the rest of us) of the content represented by those modes as ideas. 2.1 Representation Ideas are modes that express content, and when speaking of that...

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