Challenging Liberalism: Feminism as Political Critique

7. Speech, Authority, and Social Context

In Chapter 6, in examining Wendy Brown’s postmodern critique of liberal rights, I argued that Brown does not offer any real alternative to liberalism’s abstraction. Like the liberal theorists whom she criticizes, Brown fails to engage in concrete analyses of social relations of power. In this chapter, I treat the work of another postmodern feminist, Judith Butler, whose views are in many ways similar to Brown’s, and whose work suffers from a number of similar problems. Before delving into a careful analysis of how Butler’s writings on hate speech relate to my critique of liberalism, I want to note the enormous impact Butler’s work has had on feminist theory. Beginning in her groundbreaking Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, Butler has developed a Foucaultian theory of power that calls into question the traditional distinction between sex and gender (where sex refers to the biological categories of female and male, and gender to the social categories of woman and man). Rather than viewing subjects as having already formed identities, she asserts that identities are produced by power and specifically that our identities as women and men are largely the result of social forces of heteronormativity. Finally, she offers an account of subversion focused on “performativity,” which involves challenging linguistic norms through acts of resignification. Since Gender Trouble, Butler has expanded her theory in a variety of ways, and in her 1997 book, Excitable Speech, she applies her analysis to the issue of hate speech, confronting important questions of speech, authority, and social context. 7 Speech, Authority, and Social Context In Excitable Speech, Butler criticizes several feminist and antiracist theorists who advocate that pornography and racist hate speech be subject to some form of legal regulation. The theorists she cites—Rae Langton, Catharine MacKinnon, and Mari Matsuda—all put forward some version of an “equality” argument for regulating speech: speech should be subject to restriction if it subordinates, marginalizes, or harms members of an oppressed group. Employing J. L. Austin’s speech act theory and emphasizing the openended nature of speech, Butler rejects these arguments. Ultimately, she advises against enacting any restrictions on hate speech because they could work to silence those who otherwise would be roused to challenge this speech by “resignifying” and “restaging” it. I begin by summarizing Butler’s view of speech acts and by explaining the important role that the “gap” between speech and its effects plays in her theory. In the following section, I argue that Butler gives an inaccurate and problematic portrayal of what it means for a speech act to be an illocution ; I take issue with her interpretation of Austin’s account as well as with her understanding of how Langton, MacKinnon, and Matsuda apply this account. Next, I emphasize the necessity of examining relations of power in the social context in which speech acts occur. I turn to Langton’s discussion of “authority” and argue, with Langton, that the question of whether pornography or hate speech is efficacious cannot be answered without examining empirical questions about whether such speech has the authority to effect the subordination of the group it targets. I contend that Butler avoids examining this kind of evidence, and I link this avoidance to her belief that the social structure cannot be “pinned down,” since it is always changing. Finally, I critically examine Butler’s proposal for change, namely her suggestion that speech must be restaged and resignified, and her assertion that the “agency” to bring about such change is “derived from injury.”1 I claim that Butler’s analysis of how change arises lacks a crucial element: an account of the social structures of power. I conclude by suggesting that it is movements against oppression that alter the social context and make possible the “resignification” that Butler celebrates; it is not the hate speech itself—or the “gap” between speech and its effects—that incites change. Butler’s Account: Gap Between Speech and Its Effects Throughout Excitable Speech, Butler emphasizes the importance of acknowledging that there is (what she calls) a gap between speech and its effects. 134 Feminist Postmodernism When someone utters words, the exact effects that these words will have cannot be fully determined in advance; there is a gap between the intention of the speaker and the effect that the words have on the recipient. For instance, I may use words to formulate a statement that I...