The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru

Introduction

Introduction julio f. carrión The collapse of the presidency of Alberto Fujimori in November 2000 brought an end to one of the most controversial periods in the contemporary political history of Peru. After a decade in power and a contested reelection in 2000, President Fujimori was removed from office on the ground of ‘‘moral incapacity’’ by a vote of Congress. Thus far, Fujimori remains in exile in Japan and has refused to return to Peru to face the myriad investigations about his conduct in office. Fujimori’s longtime national security advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, also fled but was later detained in Venezuela and returned to Peru to face justice. In the course of the investigation of his activities, hundreds of videotapes and audiotapes were discovered that recorded the meetings held by Montesinos with an array of public officials and media and business executives. Congressional investigators examined this evidence and made the recordings public. Montesinos is currently on trial, and other members of the regime have been either convicted or are also being tried.1 The videos provide extraordinary new insights and evidence about the inner workings of the Fujimori regime. The tapes document how the government corrupted the media, manipulated the judiciary, subordinated Congress, and constructed elaborate campaigns to control public opinion and harass political opponents. With the Fujimori era concluded and with a new cache of evidence available, scholars are now in a position to write the definitive history of the Fujimori presidency, reflect on the leg- the fujimori legacy 2 acy of Fujimorismo for Peru and for the region as a whole, and draw the necessary lessons. The Authoritarian Project Fujimori depicted his political project as one of ‘‘reengineering Peru.’’ This reengineering involved stabilizing the economy through the implementation of neoliberal policies and engaging in a successful fight to end leftist guerrilla insurgencies. But Fujimori’s remaking of Peru also included the 1992 autogolpe (autocoup) that suspended the constitution and shut down Congress.2 The autogolpe was followed by eight years of governance that frequently failed to live up to the standards and practices normally associated with a democracy, even in a region such as Latin America. Very few observers doubted that Fujimori was embracing the authoritarian path when, on April 5, 1992, he decided to dissolve Congress, dismiss the judiciary, and rule by decree. International pressure forced him to call for a new election (for a new congress in charge of drafting a new constitution) but the organization and implementation of this election was left in the hands of Fujimori, the one who had broken Peru’s democratic continuity in the first place. Not surprisingly, Fujimori signi ficantly altered the existing rules in order to enhance his electoral chances (Rospigliosi 1994). Even though Fujimori had promised the Organization of American States (oas) that electoral rules would be coordinated with all political parties, his unwillingness to incorporate differing views forced many parties to abandon negotiations with the government. Moreover, the Fujimori-appointed Supreme Court named new members to the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (National Election Board [jne]), including its chair, thus preventing the success of any legal challenges from the opposition. Ultimately, the regime enacted a 147-article decree that arbitrarily set new electoral rules. Elections were to be held for a unicameral chamber containing only eighty members, elected from a single national district. Those elected would be ineligible to run for the next congress. This radical departure from existing constitutional arrangements was set before the people’s representatives had any opportunity to debate them. Most of the traditional parties rejected these new rules and refused to participate in the election, but those who participated—along with the new organizations created for that purpose—lent a false legitimacy to the electoral process. In the meantime, the press was subjected introduction 3 to harassment. Caretas, Peru’s most important political weekly, was ordered by the new Supreme Court to refrain from mentioning the name Vladimiro Montesinos in print, while its editor faced additional governmental harassment. Other journalists were subjected to investigations for their role in uncovering human rights abuses. The new constitution produced by the defective 1992 electoral process allowed Fujimori to run for immediate reelection in 1995. The 1995 presidential election results themselves are not disputed (although the congressional results are; see Chapter 11), but it is not difficult to conclude that the process that led to Fujimori’s reelection...