The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru

Conclusion: The Rise and Fall of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru

Conclusion: The Rise and Fall of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru julio f. carrión The 1960s were years of guarded hope for Latin America, particularly in Peru. The decade was characterized by a general disposition toward mild social reform meant to tackle long-standing issues of social injustice—if only to diminish the likelihood of ‘‘another Cuba.’’ With occasional help from the United States (in the form of the Alliance for Progress), reformoriented parties attempted to implement change within the confines of existing political arrangements in various Latin American countries. Policies were proposed to enact mild land reform, reduce extreme income inequalities, address urban overcrowding, and foster industrial growth. Unfortunately, at least in the Peruvian case, these policies were either blocked or significantly watered down by conservative forces that used their considerable clout in Congress to stall reform. In Peru, the unresolved issues and the promise of social reform encouraged the organized mobilization of the urban and rural working classes, who demanded greater participation in national decision making. The increasing social mobilization, the rapid growth of forces favoring radical change, and the emergence of guerrilla groups all signaled to the Peruvian military that fundamental political transformations would be required to stop these developments. The regime installed after the 1968 coup in Peru was only part of the widespread wave of military governments that swept Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s. Some of these military regimes exerted a mild rule, such as in Peru, while others were extremely repres- conclusion 295 sive, but all saw as their mission the political exclusion (and in some cases the physical elimination) of political forces that they considered inimical to the well-being of their nations. Echoing some early skepticism about the region’s cultural readiness for democracy (W. Stokes 1952), the prevalence of militarism led some to question whether Western democracy could ever take root in Latin American soil (Wiarda 1973). As Latin America gradually returned to civilian rule in the 1980s, a sense of cautious hope resurfaced. After years of military dictatorship, Latin Americans were looking forward to a new era of democratic coexistence . Although with some delay in Central America, during these years significant gains were made in terms of political inclusion. All political forces willing to participate, even those that were previously considered ‘‘dangerous,’’ were now allowed to organize and run in elections. Countries such as Peru that had denied the vote to people who were illiterate now expanded their franchises to include them. In Peru, as in other nations of the region, voting-age requirements were lowered. In other respects , however, the experience of civilian rule during the 1980s was generally disappointing. For Peru, the ‘‘lost decade’’ was characterized not only by severe economic crisis and increased political violence but also by overbearing executives. Nevertheless, unlike military regimes, these ‘‘delegative democracies’’ (O’Donnell 1994) did not seek to exclude opponents from the political game. Regrettably, in the 1990s a new kind of political regime began to crystallize in such places as Peru and Venezuela. President Alberto Fujimori of Peru went beyond the boundaries of a delegative democracy when in April 1992 he decided to shut down Congress, dismiss the Supreme Court, and rule by decree. He then used elections as a legitimizing mechanism in his efforts to remain in office. Fujimori’s frequent violations of democratic procedures were aimed at more than simply passing a preferred set of policy proposals in Congress; they were attempts to perpetuate him in office. Although Fujimori was reelected in relatively competitive elections in 1995, these elections—as was shown in the Introduction—were flawed in many respects and sanctioned an essentially authoritarian regime. Chávez seems to have embarked on a similar path in Venezuela. Unfortunately, governments like those of Fujimori and Chávez are not exceptional in contemporary times. Many of the so-called third-wave democracies have evolved into regimes that are neither dictatorial in the traditional sense nor truly democratic (Carothers 2002; Diamond 1999; Ottaway 2003). Under these regimes, limited but real political competi- the fujimori legacy 296 tion exists; one dominant player seeks to remain in power using questionable means but without completely abandoning the forms of electoral democracy. Schedler (2002), among others, uses the term ‘‘electoral authoritarianism ’’ (ea) to describe these governments, although ‘‘competitive authoritarianism’’ (Levitsky and Way 2002), ‘‘pseudo-democracy’’ (Diamond 1999), or ‘‘semi-authoritarianism’’ (Ottaway 2003) could be employed...