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S I X Catholics and Pentecostals: Possibilities for Alliance Cecilia Loreto Mariz, Maria das Dores Campos Machado, Hannah Stewart-Gambino, and Carol Ann Drogus Faith can separate, but reality unites people. —maria antônia, brazil We lived in a bubble that popped. Inside the bubble were solidarity, affection, and unity. All of this was lost. —eliana olate, chile Latin America experienced a number of dramatic changes during the 1960s and 1970s, including a new spirit of ecumenical cooperation. Especially after the wave of military coups, Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish leaders allied to denounce arbitrary imprisonment, torture, “disappearances,” and other statesponsored violence. Catholic progressives in a number of countries wove a network of solidarity and political resistance, particularly with the mainline Protestant bodies such as the Presbyterian, Methodist, and Lutheran Churches. Religious opposition to military rule and the abuses of dictatorship was especially noteworthy in Brazil and Chile, where Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish leaders cooperated in a range of national organizations, especially regarding human rights and aid to victims of state repression and terror.1 Myriad small Pentecostal churches, rather than mainline Protestant and Jewish congregations, form the dominant non-Catholic religious presence in the neighborhoods of most grassroots women activists, however. According to Cristián Parker (1996), “Pentecostals number 50–70 percent of Brazilian Protestants, and 80–95 percent of the Protestants in Chile” (143), with the majority of Pentecostals in both countries concentrated in the kinds of poorer, urban neighborhoods where our respondents live. Larger institutionalized Protestant churches have little visibility in the daily lives of the women in this 1. For descriptions of interfaith cooperation during the Brazilian military regime, see Serbin 1999. In Chile, the most visible ecumenical efforts occurred under the umbrella of the Vicaría de Solidaridad; see B. Smith 1982, and Vicaría de Solidaridad 1991. Less well known internationally is the role played by the Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas (FASIC), a prominent ecumenical human rights organization founded in 1975 that drew on wider ecumenical participation than did the vicaría (Fruhling 1989). study, whereas Pentecostal religious services can be found in storefronts, private homes, and small church buildings on streets throughout their neighborhoods.2 As women activists look around them for potential allies and organizations with which to form networks, Protestant and, most likely, Pentecostal congregations who share their neighborhoods would certainly stand out.3 What is the likelihood of such local, interdenominational alliances being formed in Brazil or Chile to further women’s political aspirations or confront community social problems? At first glance, such interfaith cooperation may seem unlikely, because the Pentecostal churches that are most visible in poor neighborhoods have historically rejected ecumenism and a rapprochement with the Catholic Church. Recruiting their members from among a Catholic population, they have typically strongly criticized Catholicism and its religious tradition. Until quite recently, Pentecostals also have declared themselves apolitical. Thus, they have pointedly distanced themselves from the social or political preoccupations that guide the actions of Catholic progressives , and they have often been regarded as an opposing, conservative religious tradition (Stewart-Gambino and Wilson 1997). According to this view, politicization among progressive Catholics and Pentecostals’ emphasis on spirituality should reinforce a general interdenominational wariness that impedes partnerships or collaboration between Catholics and evangelicals. However, changes within both Latin American Catholicism and Pentecostalism have created greater common ground for potential alliance than ever before. First, many Pentecostal groups have adopted more flexible attitudes toward morals and customs, loosening the rigidity that once separated them from their neighbors. Second, as Pentecostal congregations grow and institutionalize, they channel less energy into intragroup identity and often expend more on social and political engagement. Evidence of such an outward turn is mounting as many Pentecostals become more open to engagement with “worldly” politics, social welfare programs, and even larger social movements (Cook 1997). Pentecostal parties and elected officials are increasingly 130 Activist Faith 2. The total Protestant population in Brazil is estimated at between 13 and 15 percent, with calculations suggesting that 9–10 percent of the total population, or around 75 percent of all Protestants, are Pentecostals (Pierucci and Prandi 1995). An estimated 15–18 percent of Chileans are Protestant (Cleary 1999; Sandoval, Allende, and Castillo 1998). The author of one 1992 study of Chilean Pentecostals found that there were probably fifteen hundred Pentecostal denominations in a country of approximately 14 million people (Prado 1992). 3. Afro-Brazilian religious groups are prominent and visible in poor Brazilian neighborhoods as well. Because no...

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