Prudence: Classical Virtue, Postmodern Practice

3 After Virt

3 After Virtù rhetoric, prudence, and moral pluralism in machiavelli Eugene Garver 67 The appearance of Machiavelli’s Prince and his Discourses on Livy is a fundamental event in the history of prudence and the development of pluralism. Since we read history backwards, we can see, as Berlin has taught us to see, in Machiavelli the origins of a pluralism he himself could not have recognized .1 Looking back, we see that earlier versions of morality and humanity envisaged a world that was at least in theory unitary, in which all actions and values could coexist. After Machiavelli, we have had to live in a more complex world. We have gradually come to realize that liberalism, with its emphases on individual choice and responsibility, and on tolerance and compromise toward others, is the only practical solution to the plurality that Machiavelli eloquently makes unavoidable for us. The march from Machiavelli to the pluralism of today was, in retrospect, inevitable. Machiavelli’s originality consisted in exhibiting the incommensurability of ultimate values. To achieve one good is to fail to achieve another. To become one sort of good person is to become incapable of becoming another. The study of history and contemporary events had convinced him that there can be no direct connection between principles and consequences. Christianity leads to no certain results, but Machiavelli, always ambitious, eagerly generalizes beyond his evidence and beyond the needs of the immediate rhetorical situation and concludes that no principle guarantees success. Therefore, practical intelligence must be prudent, suited to deliberation about shifting particulars , not the logical derivation of acts from ethical first principles. Machiavelli exhibits three distinct kinds of pluralism, as he leads his readers to confront incommensurable good ends, incommensurable good abilities, and incommensurable good sources of value. There are, first, incommensurable ultimate ends or values. There is no common measure for comparing the duration of Venice with the expansions of Rome. Those are just two incompatible ways of being a good republic. There is, similarly, no common measure for adjudicating the conflicting claims of Christian and neopagan values. Those are just two possible good lives. There are, second, incommensurable good abilities and virtues, and the meaning of “good” can vary from effective to praiseworthy on other grounds. Some men succeed through caution, others through daring, some through force, and others through fraud. There are not only ultimately plural ends, but for any of them, there are, in addition, ultimately plural ways of achieving the ends. This psychological pluralism shows that there are irreducibly many possible good characters. Ends do not determine their means. Knowing what is good does not tell you what to do. Finally, Machiavelli is at the beginning of a historical development of the appreciation of multiple sources of value and allegiance. Men are loyal to their states, and France’s gain is Italy’s loss. Modern nation-states were at this time only gradually coming into existence, and so Machiavelli is not in a position to recognize the growing importance of this final kind of plurality. Whether the appropriate locus of allegiance in the latter case is Italy or Florence is an issue on which Machiavelli has no single opinion. I list this third dimension of pluralism, not because it is important in Machiavelli’s thought, but because in subsequent history, people who see the development of multiple ends and abilities often neglect this third dimension, so that the rise of nationalism which accompanies liberalism comes as a surprise. It is easy to recognize Machiavelli as an ancestor of many of the fundamental constituents of our practical world and our predicament. Machiavelli was a pluralist along all three dimensions I listed. He knew that there is no smooth connection between principles and consequences. Different principles of actions can lead to the same result, and a single principle can lead to contradictory results. He was aware that the indirect and unintended consequences of actions were often more significant than purposes and designs. He consequently emphasized the value and power of factions. He thought it essential to separate church and state, to judge religions on how well they served people ’s political ends, and to judge states on how effectively they used the peo68 . Prudence After Virtù . 69 ple’s religious faith. Yet for all that Machiavelli was no liberal. He saw greater power and wisdom in the people than in prince, yet he was no democrat either. Machiavelli was...