In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

1. See Anatoly S. Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, ed. and trans. Robert D. English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 352–58. Countdown to the Collapse of the Soviet Union the final session directly addressed the crucial backdrop to all the preceding diplomacy of the Cold War’s end: Soviet domestic politics and the mounting dual crises of the communist system and the Soviet empire. The conferees discussed efforts by Bush, Baker, and Matlock to warn Gorbachev of an impending coup. The discussants also explored the collapse of Gorbachev’s support and the final crisis and dissolution of the Soviet Union. They addressed the extent to which the policies and actions of the United States and its allies played a part in these events. There was a sharp debate on the question of whether the Soviet Union could have been saved in some form, and whether U.S. policy could have done more to support Soviet reforms. Oberdorfer: I have three questions about this whole period which I hope in the course of things will get addressed this afternoon. First, could the Soviet Union have been saved in something like the form in which it was taking shape the last year of Gorbachev? Second, should it have been saved? Would the people of Russia and the other constituent elements be better off? Would the international community and the United States be better off if it had been saved? And, third, is there anything the United States and its allies should have done which they did not do to influence the outcome as it eventually took place in the former Soviet Union? I think perhaps a good way to start is to ask Ambassador Matlock to tell us about his meeting with [Moscow] Mayor [Gavril] Popov and what happened then. Matlock: The meeting was in June—Thursday, June 20. Part of the meeting, at least, has been recorded in Mr. Chernyaev’s notes.1 I think that our perceptions of what precisely was said may differ in a few particulars, but in essence what happened was that Popov came to me—he had been invited to lunch, and I had gotten word that he couldn’t come but he’d like to call on me because I had already announced that I would be departing in a few weeks. Politically, this was a strange week in Moscow because on Monday the prime minister Mr. [Valentin] Pavlov had made a proposal to the Supreme Soviet 4 Wolhforth Chapter 4 12/27/02 12:04 AM Page 115 that he be granted extensive powers. It was in a closed session at which the head of the KGB, Mr. [Vladimir] Kryuchkov, and the minister of defense, Marshal Yazov, had spoken strongly in favor of that. That, of course, was a closed session, but they were getting as leaky as Washington is, and I think by Wednesday morning summaries of what they said had already been leaked to the press. Also, Gorbachev then announced that he had not approved this proposal and so everybody was abuzz: What the heck is going on? How can the prime minister, who is subordinate to the president and named by the president , without his knowledge go to the Parliament and ask for the transfer of some of the president’s rights to him? And then how can this be supported before the Parliament by other subordinates of the president? Okay, that was the political background in Moscow. Popov came in, and we went through social niceties, and as we chatted when nobody else was in the room, he wrote me a note saying we need to get a message to “Nikolayevich,” meaning Yeltsin. Yeltsin was that week in Washington, and he was due to meet with President Bush that very morning. Of course, that was a few hours later because this was about 12 o’clock noon Moscow time. He said we need to get word to him because there is a conspiracy to remove Gorbachev. His words in Russian were “snyat’ Gorbacheva.” He didn’t say when, but obviously he thought the matter was urgent because they had to get the word to Yeltsin. I simply wrote on it, “I’ll send a message but who is behind this?” And he took the piece of paper and wrote four names on it. The names were Kryuchkov, Pavlov, Yazov, and [Anatoly] Lukyanov. Pavlov was the prime minister, the one who had made the...

Share