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1. Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 317. An exception to the rule of downplaying the personality factor—focused on an earlier phase of the end of the Cold War—is Fred I. Greenstein, “Reagan and Gorbachev: What Difference Did They Make?” in William Wohlforth, ed., Witnesses to the End of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War: Different Perspectives on the Historical Personality Vladislav M. Zubok it is a perennial human illusion to attribute great events to great causes. Particularly during the past century scholars have tended to attribute transitions from one historical period to another to grand, impersonal forces—shifts in balance of power, inter-imperialist contradictions, revolutions, the rise of new ideologies and social movements, and so on. In the current scholarly climate the other extreme has become fashionable: to highlight the microlevels of history—the role and beliefs of “common people,” incremental changes in social life, and power as a phenomenon of everyday life. As a result of these two trends, the view that history is shaped by “great men” is utterly discredited . Today, many historians would rather die than admit that the character of a personality in a position of power at a critical juncture can make a major difference in the course of history. Among recent exceptions is the figure of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. This energetic, handsome man with sparkling eyes and charming smile “did more than anyone else to end the Cold War between East and West,” asserts British political scientist Archie Brown in his seminal study, The Gorbachev Factor. Yet his book deals more with the domestic field of Gorbachev’s activities than with his foreign policy. And surprisingly, in discussing the reasons for Gorbachev’s policies, Brown gives only slight attention to the character and personal traits of the last Soviet leader: Gorbachev is a “factor” in his study, not a human being in flesh and spirit.1 Perhaps this reluctance to address Gorbachev the person can be excused. It is indeed very hard to write about a living historical personality. Proximity warps our vision. But is it possible to evaluate recent history without evaluating a person who so dramatically influenced its course? It is worth quoting Anatoly Chernyaev, the most loyal and supportive of Gorbachev’s assistants. 7 Wolhforth Chapter 7 12/27/02 12:34 AM Page 207 Gorbachev, he claims, “was not ‘a great man’ as far as a set of personal qualities was concerned.” But he “fulfilled a great mission,” and that is “more important for history.”2 A more critical Dmitry Volkogonov provides another, yet also remarkable estimate: Gorbachev “is a person of great mind, but with a weak character. Without this paradox of personality it is hard to understand him as a historical actor.” Volkogonov writes that the “intellect, feelings, and will of Gorbachev” left a unique imprint on the Soviet transition.3 The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate in what ways Gorbachev’s less-than-great personality shaped the end of the Cold War. I proceed in three sections. In the first, I discuss the standard explanations of the Cold War’s end that highlight structural changes in the international system, a structural domestic crisis within the Soviet Union, and a radical shift of ideas in the Soviet leadership, showing the important anomalies they all leave unexplained. I then analyze Gorbachev’s personality and character in general, revealing what it was that set him apart from other leaders. In the third section, I assess in detail how these personality and character traits influenced the ending of the Cold War. The bottom line is that many of the most extraordinary aspects of this remarkable series of events can only be understood by according primary importance to the Gorbachev personality factor. The Standard Explanations—and Their Shortcomings Realists argue that by the mid-1980s the distribution of capabilities shifted drastically in favor of the United States and the West. Relative decline offered the Soviets no practical alternative to a policy of imperial retrenchment and engagement with the powerful West.4 When the Kremlin leadership perceived this power shift, it brought its behavior in accordance with reality. It is obvious, however, that that reality, as harsh as it was, did not automatically dictate one set of perceptions (or a single “narrative” as a modern theorist would say). In the Kremlin, as everywhere else, the distance between reality and perception was great...

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