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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A p p e n d i x : M a c I n t y r e ’ s P r o j e c t In reviewing MacIntyre’s intellectual project, it is important to note that he self-consciously employs the notion of a “moral tradition” in a way that far exceeds the usual understanding of ‘morality.’1 It is something more akin to Wittgenstein’s notion of a form of life or even the more contemporary notion of a conceptual structure. Different societies have different underlying assumptions , goals, and values. These assumptions, goals, and values color judgments made in a particular society; effectively, they set up a standard of rationality for that society. With different societies, there are different standards of rationality, and what may be held as true in one society may not be held as true in another. In fact, what is taken for true in one society may not even be understood in a radically different society, and this problem is labeled incommensurability . As MacIntyre uses the term, incommensurability comes in two forms. The first type obtains when one system of thought (a moral tradition or a scientific tradition) evolves out of another. The later tradition (for instance , Newtonian physics) contains notions (inertia, mass) that were not part of the earlier (for example, Aristotelian physics). The second type occurs when two developed traditions—whether historically linked or not—offer rival interpretations of the same phenomena. MacIntyre presents the Encyclopedic tradition and the Geneologic tradition as examples of this later form of incommensurability in Three Rival Theories. The Encyclopedic tradition, inheritor of the Enlightenment (and especially the Scottish Enlightenment), holds to a universalistic account of humankind and rationality. There is an unvarying truth that is common to all societies, and the claims of a society must be judged relative to this standard. The Geneological tradition rejects such universalism as a fiction. There are no eternal truths. Truth is relative to the various societies and their competing systems of rationality.2 1. See MacIntyre’s remarks on “moral enquiry” in Three Rival Theories, 2–3. 2. After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, ed. John Horton and Susan 180 . . . . . . . Appendix: MacIntyre’s Project MacIntyre is most concerned about the second type of incommensurability , in part because he sees it as part of the moral chaos of the modern period and its advocacy of liberalism. Whereas in After Virtue he argues that liberalism is the absence of a tradition, in later writings—including Which Justice? Whose Rationality? and Three Rival Theories—he sees liberalism as a tradition that incorporates many incommensurable points of view. In fact, this situation of chaos is an almost necessary consequence of the individualism fostered by liberalism. In Three Rival Theories, MacIntyre argues against Davidson’s attempts to abolish the notion that there can be incommensurability among conceptual schemes, and MacIntyre insists that incommensurability is a serious problem.3 He also presents a way around the seemingly impossible deadlock between the Encyclopedists and the Geneologists. This is his notion of the third rival tradition of moral enquiry: “Tradition.” “Tradition” as MacIntyre uses the term is really Thomism. In MacIntyre’s eyes, its strength is its ability to overcome the divide between incommensurable frameworks by holding onto the ideal of the universalism of the Encyclopedists while acknowledging the historical relativity emphasized by the Geneologists. But there are many difficulties with MacIntyre’s position. Not the least of these is that the story of Thomas, as recounted by MacIntyre, is essentially a story about Thomism’s role in overcoming certain historical incommensurabilities (the first type of incommensurability mentioned above), and it is unlikely that these historical lessons apply to the incommensurability between the Encyclopedists and the Geneologists. Moreover, it is not even clear that MacIntyre’s claims for the success of Thomism in overcoming (historical) incommensurability are justified. In examining MacIntyre’s comments about Thomism, we are immediately faced with a difficulty. In After Virtue, MacIntyre sees the Aristotelian tradition (or at least the core notion of virtues deriving from this tradition) as the best candidate for solving the failures of present-day liberalism. He specifically labels Thomas Aquinas a “marginal figure” in the story of this Aristotelian tradition of moral inquiry.4 Yet, in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Aquinas emerges as the central character in the history of the Aristotelian tradition. His role is even more emphasized in Three Rival Theories. Although MacIntyre’s Whose Justice? Which Rationality? downplays the importance of...

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