Conscience and Other Virtues: From Bonaventure to MacIntyre

12. Conscience and Other Virtues

t w e l v e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CONSCIENCE and OTHER VIRTUES Influenced by the work of, among others, Butler, Kant, and Freud, many philosophers in this century accepted the view that conscience is to be regarded as a faculty. Having done this, they went on to argue that there is no conscience because there is no such faculty. At best, ‘conscience’ is shorthand for something else: moral reasoning, a personal monitor, emotive responses . Moreover, the horrific events of the past century have caused many to question whether there is the moral guiding force that conscience is thought to provide. This all-too-pervasive dismissal of conscience is unfortunate and displays an ignorance of the history of the notion of conscience. In the Middle Ages, conscience was not viewed as a faculty; on the contrary, it was seen as an aspect of practical reasoning. Even more important, in the years following Aquinas’s Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, such medieval thinkers as Scotus and Ockham linked conscience with issues associated 174 . . . . . . . Conscience as a Key to Virtue Ethics with the development and cultivation of the virtues. I have argued that this insight is one contemporary virtue ethicists should take to heart, for virtue ethicists have also neglected to talk about conscience even though it is critical for any ethics of virtue. I have suggested that conscience be regarded as a relational entity. Such an understanding of conscience allows it to play the multiple roles in a moral agent that a conscience needs to play. As a relational entity, it can be involved in moral reasoning, be a part of the emotive commitment to follow the good determined through moral reasoning, express the positive egoideal a moral agent strives to attain, and guide the emotive reactions to the attainment of an ideal or the failure to do so. Yet, it is also convenient to treat conscience as if it were a substantial entity, taking care not to treat it as a faculty. The convenience concerns principally issues connected with the development of conscience. It is far easier to develop a conscience without paying attention to its complexities as a relational entity, especially in the earliest stages of formation. A Jiminy Cricket proclaiming that conscience should be your guide is a better teaching device for the young than a moral expert concerned with fine distinctions between systems and entities. In its earliest stages, conscience will be centered on the parental and societal rules and assumptions taught to the moral agent. Obviously, these rules and assumptions differ from society to society to the extent that the societies themselves differ. This early training will impress in the moral agent the goals and means to these goals that the parents and the society want to be impressed. This will be achieved through direct moral instruction , the telling of stories, and informal intercourse with other moral agents. Moral exemplars will be pointed to, and moral agents will be encouraged to imitate them. Advice about behavior and demands to follow certain rules will be given in an attempt to move the moral agent in approved directions. Necessarily, the virtues approved by parental figures and the society as a whole will be taught and extolled, for these virtues not only express the desired goods of a society but will be seen as the best means for achieving these goods. Proper training will make these virtues desirable for the agent and specify ways that they can be developed. And the moral agent will use this stock of moral education to perform the first actions leading (with luck) to the formation of good habits. Without a doubt, a great part of successful training of moral agents at this stage will be a molding of emotions like guilt and pride. The moral agent will be trained to regret not achieving desired goals (performing specific actions or developing special habits) and to take Conscience and Other Virtues . . . . . . . 175 pride in achieving them. The deeper the moral agent is trained in the virtues , the stronger the commitment to following conscience will become. This early stage of conscience—the conventional conscience—must, however, give way to more complex stages. To develop successfully, the moral agent must modify the parental and societal advice to fit his or her particular circumstances. As Aristotle pointed out, what might be a good rule for a person of rash temperament would not be an appropriate rule for the timid...