Conscience and Other Virtues: From Bonaventure to MacIntyre

10. Conscience Among the Virtue Ethicists

t e n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CONSCIENCE AMONG THE VIRTUE ETHICISTS It is by now a commonplace to remark that, among philosophers, there has been during the last twenty years a resurgence of interest in the virtues.1 To be sure, many more articles and books espousing either a deontological or a consequentialist ethics are still being written than ones espousing a virtue ethics, yet the marked renewal of interest is undeniable. Many trace the renewal to Prichard’s essay “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”2 but the scarcity of work on the virtues between 1912 and the 1960s suggests 1. Among those who claim this are John McDowell in “Virtue and Reason” (The Monist 62 [July 1979]: 331–50); Gregory E. Pence in “Recent Work on Virtues” (American Philosophical Quarterly 21 [1984]: 281–96); Gregory Trianosky in “What Is Virtue Ethics All About?” (American Philosophical Quarterly 27 [1990]: 335–44); and Robert B. Kruschwity and Robert C. Roberts in The Virtues: Contemporary Essays on Moral Character (Belmont, Calif.: Wordsworth, 1987). 2. Published in Mind (1912): 21–37. 136 . . . . . . . Conscience as a Key to Virtue Ethics more recent sources. Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” and Von Wright’s The Varieties of Goodness seem more likely sources of recent interest.3 But most people would regard Alasdair MacIntyre’s work as playing a key role in the revival of virtue ethics. Odd as it may seem, however, MacIntyre ’s influence, while immense, occurs in spite of the intellectual project he is engaged in. MacIntyre and the Virtues In 1981, Alasdair MacIntyre published his remarkable book After Virtue.4 Offering an analysis and critique of the reigning contemporary moral theory— liberalism—the book generated a number of reactions. Some people questioned just what kind of book it was, because it blurs the distinction between philosophy and history.5 Others wondered about the correctness of MacIntyre’s account of the virtues.6 Still others wondered at MacIntyre’s account of how easily the Aristotelian tradition of the virtues entered into the developing Christian tradition of the Latin West.7 The second edition of After Virtue, published in 1984, responded to these reactions and offered a promissory note that a forthcoming volume would further MacIntyre’s intellectual project. The promissory note was paid off in 1988 with the publication of Whose Justice? Which Rationality?8 An added bonus was the publication of Three Rival Theories of Enquiry: Geneology, Encyclopedia, Tradition in 1990.9 Although After Virtue struck a resonating chord among ethicists interested in the role of the virtues in ethics, MacIntyre wrote in his preface to Whose Justice? Which Rationality? that “this enabled me to respond to another lacuna in After Virtue, one emphasized by more than one critic who misrepresented that book as a defense of ‘a morality of the virtues’ as an alternative to a 3. G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” originally published in Philosophy 33 (January 1958): 1–19. Reprinted in The Collected Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe, Vol. I: Ethics, Religion, and Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 26–42; George Henrik Von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963). 4. After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1st ed. 1981, 2d ed. 1984). All subsequent references to the work are to the second edition. 5. See MacIntyre’s presentation of William K. Frankena’s remarks in After Virtue, 265. 6. See MacIntyre’s presentation of Samuel Scheffler’s remarks in After Virtue, 272. 7. See MacIntyre’s presentation of Jeffrey Stout’s remarks in After Virtue, 278. 8. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). 9. Three Rival Theories of Enquiry: Encyclopedia, Geneology, Tradition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). Conscience Among Virtue Ethicists . . . . . . . 137 ‘morality of rules.’”10 This comment reveals a remarkable aspect of MacIntyre ’s tripartite intellectual project: It is not chiefly concerned with the virtues in the same sense that classical and medieval proponents of the virtue tradition were concerned with them. In fact, the main focus of MacIntyre’s project is on the rationality and commensurability of traditions. This emphasis comes to the fore in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? as well as in Three Rival Theories. The virtues—and the virtue tradition in ethics—have never been MacIntyre’s principal interest. Even After Virtue was intended more to show the poverty of modern-day liberalism...