The Theology of Thomas Aquinas

Chapter Twelve: “Bearing the Marks of Christ’s Passion: ”Aquinas’ Soteriology

  Twelve “Bearing the Marks of Christ’s Passion” Aquinas’ Soteriology    An engagement with Aquinas’ soteriology may appear unattractive, given modern concerns.1 Modern soteriology puts less emphasis on salvation from sin than is the case in more traditional soteriologies. For Jürgen Moltmann, for instance, the perspective has shifted from sin to suffering, and in his work The Crucified God he develops a challenging soteriology, written in the shadow of Auschwitz. Even when sin remains in focus, the emphasis is now more on the social aspect of sin (social injustice), as in Liberation theology, rather than in terms of a broken relationship between God and the human person. Whereas Protestant theologians such as Moltmann and Jungel developed an interesting theologia crucis (and in doing so drew a close link between soteriology and theodicy), major Catholic theologians such as Schillebeeckx and Rahner fail—or refuse—to attribute any intrinsic salvific significance to the cross of Christ. Indeed, the cross has become somewhat problematic in modern Catholic theology. There appear to be a number of reasons for this. First, focusing on the cross as the primary redeeming event appears to be one-sided and goes at the expense of Jesus’ broader message of the Kingdom of God. More importantly, attributing redeeming value to the suffering of the Son seems to entail a rather problematic concept of God (evoking the specter of a cruel God whose divine anger had to   Rik Van Nieuwenhove be appeased by the sacrifice of his Son). This transactional view (a “sadistic and bloody myth,” as Schillebeeckx occasionally puts it)2 should be rejected, not only because of this problematic concept of God, but also because it might be misused as a glorification of innocent suffering. According to Schillebeeckx and others , Jesus’ death is the side effect of his faithful adherence to his cause and is devoid of any redeeming value as such. Undoubtedly, the immense suffering of the twentieth century has alerted us to the obscenity of attributing redeeming value to the suffering of innocent people. In the face of such suffering, it is argued, we should keep silent and refrain from constructing theories, whether philosophical or theological: the problem of evil and suffering cannot be solved intellectually but only through praxis. These views may appear attractive at first, and they certainly meet some of our modern sensitivities. However, emptying the death of Jesus of all salvific power contradicts the New Testament witness (including, in all likelihood, the way Jesus himself viewed his passion) and the ensuing tradition of Christian reflection on the cross. In my view, Aquinas’ soteriology still proves useful because it can accommodate these modern concerns while remaining more faithful than some of the recent soteriologies to the way the New Testament views the central role of the cross. Also, although Aquinas sees Christ’s salvific work primarily in terms of deliverance from sin, he is not inattentive to the social aspects of sin, or its link with suffering—in relation to the latter issue, this link is probably even closer in Aquinas’ work than in modern understandings. Finally, although Aquinas clearly attributes salvific significance to the cross of Christ, this is not the sole focus of his soteriology; nor does it mean that he espouses a judicial or “transactional” theory of salvation. I hope to clarify these issues throughout this essay. I will pay particular attention to the problem of suffering and evil, not only because of the close link between soteriology and theodicy in modern theology, but also because sharing in the suffering of Christ is a major theme in Aquinas’ soteriology. Although this essay is written with some of these modern concerns in mind, my primary goal is to expound Aquinas’ doctrine as such, allowing his voice to be heard by referring to his own writings throughout the text. In the first of the following six sections, my perspective is rather broad and somewhat preliminary: I consider the relation between divine and human causality—a topic that has bearings on the understanding of the “contingency” and “necessity” of the cross. Similarly, in the second section I examine in a fairly general vein the relation between divine providence and evil, and in the third, I discuss how Aquinas describes the nature of sin. The topic of the relation between sin and providence leads to a discussion of “punishment” in the fourth section, and of the meaning of “satisfaction” and its relation to...