Cuban Catholics in the United States, 1960-1980: Exile and Integration

6. "Just and Necessary War"

Chapter Six “Just and Necessary War” We have not yet lost our desire for a future return. —José Ignacio Rasco (1969) At the end of the 1960s, José Ignacio Rasco, the prominent leader of the Cuban Christian Democratic Movement, reflected on the nature of the Cuban community in Miami. He characterized the community as distinct and deeply nationalistic. Some sectors of the community remained defiantly closed and isolated, while others absorbed some measure of North American influence, but most exhibited an exile identity that adamantly rejected any notion of assimilating into the new society. He perceived that an ethnocentric communitarian conscience thrived in Miami, “which is a bulwark against decubanization.” Though outside of Cuba they did not forget; they remained focused on their homeland. “We have not yet lost our desire for a future return,” he said.1 Exile identity existed to safeguard the possibility of an eventual return. Exile manifested itself not only in nationalism, anti-communism, and visions of a future homeland, but also in concrete and consuming activism. Literally hundreds of political organizations conspired against the Cuban 156 government, including followers of Batista, Auténtico politicians who governed in the 1940s, the Ortodoxo leaders that challenged the Auténticos during the same era, leaders of the main labor organizations, industrialists, and many others. Though unified in their opposition to Castro and communism , these various organizations represented a diversity of political persuasions, from conservatives to social democrats and of course Christianinspired groups. All of this contributed to a highly politicized community dedicated to action that endured without weakening throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Though Cuban exiles often disagreed about the best approaches for fighting communism, which varied over time, they did agree on the necessity of developing concrete strategies for struggle, whether through direct armed movements, diplomatic pressure, developing effective public discourses, or directly lobbying the United States government. Only negotiating with the Cuban government remained off limits, though in time this too emerged as a controversial and divisive strategy for return. Whatever their approach, as one exile declared, Cubans could never be indifferent to “the tragedy that our country is living.” They did not flee to the United States to become comfortable, regain wealth, reconstitute what had been lost, or even find tranquility and peace. Instead, “We have come here prepared to fight, to organize a crusade, to struggle for God and for Cuba for as long as we have the slightest breath in our bodies.” “Today our Christianity is the Christianity of the days of the catacombs, ruled by persecution and martyrdom,” which requires everyone to be “on the front line, facing the enemy, willing to sacrifice all rather than abandon ground or flag.”2 Armed Action Despite the inability of Catholic resistance movements to slow the Revolution in Cuba during 1960 and 1961, activities continued unabated in exile with the full encouragement and significant funding by the United States. Not all exiles embraced U.S. covert support with equal enthusiasm. For some this was a bitter pill to swallow, but most believed that they had little choice and that it offered the only realistic opportunity to depose Castro, who received significant military resources from the communist bloc. Furthermore, most Catholics did not feel constrained by their faith to “Just and Necessary War” 157 participate in armed actions against the government in Cuba, though the most devout did operate within what they considered the parameters outlined by Catholic tradition. Just as they thought Catholicism had permitted insurrectionary actions against Batista, most Catholics concluded that antiCastro military operations also fell within the bounds of just war theory. Many had justified the use of violence against Batista and did so again against Castro, while others simply took it as self-evident, not needing justification and suspending religious argument altogether. As he did in 1958, church legal expert José Ignacio Lasaga expressed his opinion that exiles could act against Cuban communism as long as actions were part of an effective war effort that had a real possibility of eliminating the oppressive system on the island, though this did not include assassinations, terrorism, or other morally objectionable tactics.3 Even the Cuban exile clergy seemed to accept this interpretation and did not speak against the constant paramilitary preparations in exile during the 1960s. The United States quite early on decided to rely on the Cuban opposition to undermine Castro. Already in November 1959, President Eisenhower had accepted a...