The Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile

Appendix C

169 Appendix C Monitoring Indicators after 1978 Internal Monitoring Table C.1 shows levels of the seven indicators of internal monitoring for the period after 1978. Rationales for each code are given below. We can infer that one important change after 1978 was an increase in overall information to the principals on the CNI’s own operations Table C.1 Internal Monitoring, 1978–90 Low Medium High PROCESS Internal reporting by agents to superiors on X their activities (IM1) Monitors’ briefings on agents’ operations X to principals (IM2) Information clearinghouse (IM3) ? Number of monitors divided by number of agents (IM4) X OUTCOME Principal’s self-reported trust in agents (IM5) X Intra- and interbranch coordination (IM6) X Corruption and coercion for personal ends (IM7) X 170 Appendix C and on those of other organizations. For the moment, without complete access to the entire collection of the regime’s archives, we cannot be completely certain about the full extent of information availability. Nevertheless, we can infer an improvement based on several pieces of evidence. For instance, given that the CNI was more constrained than the DINA with regard to domestic operations, it is reasonable to infer that information on its operations was more readily available through established (formal and informal military) channels. Moreover, the DINA relied more than the CNI on right-wing civilians and paramilitary groups. These included many of the Cóndor operatives, such as local right-wing groups in Argentina, the United States, and Italy. The CNI relied almost exclusively on its own personnel, recruited mainly from the different branches of the armed forces (especially the army). It was easier for principals to obtain information on the operations of an organization whose agents belonged to a known entity and to well-established structures under their own control than on operations of organizations outside their direct control. Consequently, we can gather that the principals (not only Pinochet but also the cabinet and the junta) received better information from the coercive agents on their operations , as well as better reporting on other agents’ actions. Therefore, IM1 and IM2 = High. In one respect, the full extent of which is hard to gauge at this point without an ability to delve inside the DINA’s and the CNI’s archives, it is possible that internal monitoring decreased with the CNI. Although the CNI inherited the bulk of the DINA’s personnel and physical infrastructure , Contreras took what appears to have been a great deal of information with him (in the form of archives). How many archives or how valuable is not clear. Nevertheless, this suggests a reason why at least with respect to its capacity as information clearinghouse the CNI might have been less effective than the DINA. I have therefore coded this with a question mark (IM3 = Medium?). Internal monitoring increased according to another criterion, however . Unlike the DINA, which was an independent institution, separate from the rest of the armed forces, the regime placed the CNI under the Ministry of Defense. Whereas Contreras had reported only to Pinochet, the head of the CNI reported to the president through the Ministry of Appendix C 171 the Interior. This gave the CNI a status similar to that of the Carabineros . While it was not technically a branch of the armed forces, both were military institutions and were given status as such under the Ministry of Defense. This status governed, for example, the jurisdiction of military courts over their actions and their career or officer structure. For day-to-day operational purposes, however, the Ministry of the Interior directed both. In other words, this change in status introduced at least two new internal oversight mechanisms over the CNI (thus IM4 = Medium). This was a significant shift that meant essentially that Pinochet gave up the monopoly control over coercion he had enjoyed under the DINA. Even though the DINA was technically under the jurisdiction of the junta, in practice Manuel Contreras reported exclusively to Pinochet. With respect to trust, on the face of it there is no reason to assume that Pinochet (or the junta) fundamentally mistrusted the CNI, its leadership , or the other coercive agencies. However, at least two cases suggest otherwise. The first was the replacement of Mena by the more hard-line General Humberto Gordon. Pinochet removed Mena shortly after the MIR assassinated the director of the army’s Intelligence School, Colonel Roger Vergara, on July 15, 1980...