The Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile

Appendix A

150 Appendix A Monitoring Indicators, September−December 1973 Internal Monitoring Table A.1 shows levels of the seven indicators of internal monitoring for the period of September−December 1973. Rationales for each code are given below. Table A.1 Internal Monitoring (September–December 1973) Low Medium High PROCESS Internal reporting by agents to superiors on their activities (IM1) X Monitors’ briefings on agents’ operations to principals (IM2) X Information clearinghouse (IM3) X Number of monitors divided by number of agents (IM4) X OUTCOME Principal’s trust in agents (IM5) X Intra- and interbranch coordination (IM6) X Corruption and coercion for personal ends (IM7) X Appendix A 151 Upon seizing power, the junta used Article 75 of the Code of Military Justice (Código de Justicia Militar) to delegate broad powers to local division commanders. This included not only administrative powers but also the power to carry out military tribunals and to pass sentence (Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation 1993, 131). There were few established procedures, and there was a great deal of variation in the application of coercion. Some local commanders took a harder line than others did. In some places commanders imposed strict discipline, while in others (especially in more remote regions) local police and soldiers were less constrained and could enact personal revenge. As a result, there was a great deal of variation in terms of how prisoners were treated. Some sectors of the military acted as though they were fighting a war against a serious and well-armed enemy (which was largely a fabrication) and took a decidedly hard-line stance against all opposition. General Alejandro Medina, whose duty as leader of the Black Berets Battalion within the army was to conduct house-to-house raids through working-class neighborhoods, defended hard-line measures by stating, “No one likes to have his house raided. But if there are rats inside, you accept that someone comes in and gets them out” (Constable and Valenzuela 1991, 20). Medina believed that “the country was in a state of war at least until November 1973.” His combat souvenir is a beret that received a bullet hole through it while he was wearing it. “I am alive,” he said in characteristic bluster, “thanks to those dummies’ bad aim”.1 But not all sectors within the military shared this view. In the provinces, in particular, which had not experienced the same types of sporadic armed resistance and sense of war found in Santiago, relations between military commanders and the local authorities from the Allende government often continued in much the same way as before the coup. Where there were prisoners, many local commanders adhered strictly to military procedure in terms of treatment and due legal process for the military tribunals. In these circumstances, the level of internal reports by agents to superiors was probably in the middle range. There was no doubt a great deal of reporting, and the junta appears to have had a reasonably good 152 Appendix A idea of broad patterns such as the number of prisoners and casualties. But the great variation in the administration of coercion during this time suggests that reporting on many aspects of coercion was patchy, ad hoc, and in many cases unreliable. As a result, I have coded IM1 = Medium. Regarding IM2, the Informe Rettig reports that the commission could not “determine exactly what role was played by the different intelligence services of the armed forces and police in the provinces during this period or how that role was coordinated with that of the officers [in charge]” (Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation 1993, 131). While this could mean that the various intelligence agencies reported accurately and consistently on their branches’ operations, this appears unlikely. The reason is that internal reporting was not the mandate of the intelligence services. (Reporting on enemy activities was.) As a result, also, I have conservatively coded the monitors’ reporting to their superiors as reflective of medium levels of internal monitoring (IM2 = Medium), given the chaotic situation and the lack of clarity over division of powers. The principal clearinghouse for information about prisoners was the Servicio Nacional de Detenidos (SENDET). The SENDET was created in November 1973 to administer the prison camps. The SENDET was usually the first place where relatives of those who had been detained looked for information (often without success). But there are several reasons why the SENDET failed to...