The Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile

SEVEN: Options and Shifts

112 S E V E N Options and Shifts As shown in previous chapters, the regime created the DINA to resolve specific organizational problems, but the DINA did not completely take over and redirect coercion, and conflicts remained between the DINA and other coercive agencies (in particular the air force’s intelligence agency [SIFA] and the Comando Conjunto), which undermined regime cohesion. Moreover, as the DINA ran increasingly amok, unconstrained by any other power inside the regime, it failed to deliver on the promise of plausible deniability. Risky and high-profile acts of international terrorism such as the Letelier assassination provoked U.S. retaliation over and above the growing international pressures caused by the human rights violations. Further, the DINA’s excesses helped galvanize support both inside Chile and abroad for watchdog groups such as the Vicaría (see Appendix C), which increased external monitoring of the regime. Most seriously, the DINA and the reformist sectors inside the regime clashed repeatedly over all aspects of the DINA’s operations. The DINA mistrusted the civilians and spied on them, and the civilians for their part understood that projecting the regime into the future required bringing the DINA under control (or taming the “bucking horse,” in Guzmán’s words). Put differently, the DINA did not deliver substantially higher levels of internal monitoring and failed as well to curb an increase in external monitoring of its activities. Instead of well-coordinated and highly secretive actions against the regime’s enemies, the DINA’s operations were often heavy-handed, clumsy, and visible. In this context, what options were available to deal with the problems posed by the DINA? The regime’s options essentially boiled down to either maintaining or altering the levels of internal and external monitoring . Options and Shifts 113 With respect to internal monitoring, the options available to the junta principals were to decrease it, keep it the same, or increase it. One way to decrease internal monitoring would have been to get rid of the DINA altogether and to return the regime to the type of coercion employed during the first several months after the coup. The other branches of the armed forces and the Carabineros could have taken on a more active independent role, reporting to each of their superiors but not to the junta or Pinochet in a comprehensive way. Another option could have been to weaken the DINA substantially, abridging its informationgathering and reporting abilities. While in theory it would have been possible to adopt either course of action, in practice neither was likely. Both options would have returned the regime to a kind of organizational pattern similar to what existed during the first several months after the coup, with the attendant similar problems of coordination and control that prompted all the complaints against the regime discussed in chapter 3. Moreover, instead of providing the reformers with the necessary control they sought over the coercive forces, these options would have afforded them far less. Keeping internal monitoring the same could likewise have been accomplished with or without the DINA and Contreras. The regime could have chosen to keep the DINA under Contreras, notwithstanding pressure against it from international sources and from critics inside the military and among civilian supporters. This alternative would no doubt have been attractive to many hard-line sectors within the regime. Pinochet himself may also have had an interest in keeping Contreras, given his direct and close relationship with the DINA’s director. However, while in theory it would have been possible to do this, this option would not have resolved the problems of the DINA’s tensions with the other branches, and it would not have given the reformers any greater leverage over coercion. Under these circumstances, the pressure to get rid of the DINA and Contreras increased the costs of this option. Keeping the same level of internal monitoring as before but without the DINA could have been accomplished by having the agents in the different branches of the armed forces monitor each other and report to the top. Or Pinochet could have replaced the DINA and Contreras with another institution and leader that reported directly and exclusively to him; 114 The Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile this would likely have eased some of the domestic and international pressures against the regime for the DINA’s excesses. But while many would have been happy to be rid...