The Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile

SIX: The Fall of the DINA (1977–78)

100 S I X The Fall of the DINA (1977–78) A second shift in how the dictatorship organized its repressive agencies took place from 1977 to 1978. In August 1977, the regime replaced the DINA with a different institution, the Central Nacional de Informaciones (CNI). At first, the DINA team also led the CNI, with Contreras and his men still at the helm, but this team fell from power in April 1978, and their departure coincided with perhaps the most important political shift during the entire dictatorship.1 The CNI adopted a new modus operandi , the number of victims fell sharply in 1978, operations abroad were curtailed, and there were practically no more disappearances during the rest of the regime. For the first time, also, civilians were appointed to the majority of cabinet positions, including the Ministry of the Interior (the leading cabinet position). As part of this change, the civilians gained control over the security apparatus led by the new CNI, now placed directly under the supervision of the minister of the interior. One of the first measures implemented by the new civilian-led cabinet was an amnesty for all human rights violations committed between 1973 and 1978. With this measure, the regime announced it was opening a new chapter and leaving behind the violence of the past.2 Restrictions on civil liberties were also relaxed, a move that permitted new opposition groups to appear. What was behind this shift? Why was there a shift at all, and why did it include such a profound reorganization not simply of the repressive agencies but of the regime in general? The Fall of the DINA (1977–78) 101 A Cosmetic Shift? A common view regarding this shift is that the replacement of the DINA by the CNI was largely cosmetic—that the CNI was the continuation of the DINA by another name.At best, the regime played a subtle game of smoke and mirrors to appear to be addressing the problem of the human rights violations without changing much of substance.3 It is true that the CNI was the DINA’s legal successor and that both organizations shared many similarities. A point-by-point comparison of D.L. No. 521, which created the DINA, and D.L. No. 1828, which created the CNI, shows them to be extremely similar (Rojas 1988, 36–39). There was also a great deal of continuity between both institutions in terms of personnel and physical infrastructure. A large portion of the DINA’s staff continued to work under the CNI, and the new organization continued to use many of the DINA’s principal bases of operations.4 Yet despite these similarities and continuities, the differences between the two institutions were significant. For example, the DINA was an autonomous institution, but the CNI was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense, and it reported to the president through the Ministry of the Interior. Also, even though much of the DINA staff continued to work in the CNI, former DINA chief Manuel Contreras left precious few files for the new CNI. In addition, the cooperation of the DINA officers who remained was said to be “meager” (Cavallo Castro, Salazar Salvo, and Sepúlveda Pacheco 1989, 194). At first, the CNI was also given fewer powers than the DINA. As noted in previous chapters, one of the three secret articles in D.L. No. 521 gave the DINA broad powers to carry out detentions. By contrast, the CNI’s powers of arrests were more constrained. It enjoyed no secret powers, and it required a court order to carry out detentions (Frühling 2000). Nevertheless, the CNI made use of Article 1 of D.L. No. 1009, which gave it the power to make “preventive detentions” under states of emergency or siege. The CNI carried out thousands of arrests this way (Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura 2004).5 The CNI’s structure was also different from the DINA’s. A general always headed it, and it maintained more bases of operations, throughout a larger part of the country, than its predecessor had.6 The CNI 102 The Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile inherited all the DINA’s property and added several more bases of operations .7 Available evidence suggests that it maintained a staff of about 2,200, half of whom were military and half civilian (de...