Reason, Tradition, and the Good: MacIntyre's Tradition-Constituted Reason and Frankfurt School Critical Theory

Chapter 5: Beyond Relativism: Reasonable Progress and Learning From

171 5 Beyond Relativism Reasonable Progress and Learning from But where then does this leave us when it comes to the matter of judging our rationality, our form of life, our culture in relation to those of others? . . . [H]ow are we to condemn Nazis, or Serbs, or the present government of China, or the sentiments and actions of . . . terrorists? . . . [H]ow are we to call into question and reject our friend’s decisions and actions when we discover that she has embezzled money from her doubtless oppressive and exploitative employer in order to pay off the $10,000.00 balance on her credit cards which had been run up by a man who claimed to be a friend, but who has now absconded ? —Araminta Stone Johnston, “Theory, Rationality, and Relativism” Whether we talk about the military-industrial complex that hides the loss of hundreds and thousands of innocent lives in the language of “collateral damage,”1 or we discuss deals made between the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and agribusinesses that limit the number of “illegal” immigrants the agency can pick up from their businesses each night,2 or we look at the thousands of female human beings, mostly children, sold each year in the sex-trafficking business, or the laws which give corporations rights to free speech but deny that corporations can be punished for the illegal practices of their R E A S o N , T R A D I T Io N , A N D T H E G o o D 172 chief officers—in each case we are discussing activities that harm individual human beings. Any philosophy that justifies or supports such destructive practices, policies, beliefs, and ways of life is immoral and wrong. This statement clearly challenges my argument that reason and morality go hand in hand and, moreover, that reason is relative to traditions in the sense that no objective standards of substantive reason exist that apply across traditions or that allow one to judge traditions other than the one of which one is a member. Substantive standards of reason and principles of morality and political theory, I have asserted, are justified or not within their home traditions. My thesis and theory of substantive reason do not abet destructive practices, policies, beliefs, and ways of life. I will show this, first, in a simple defense of the theory against the charge of incoherence, leveled by Donald Davidson and like-minded theorists against any theory that presumes there are incommensurable anythings, particularly languages. Davidson’s argument misses the point. Translating languages uncovers the underlying rival substantive reasons working in rival traditions. Second, I will examine the role of truth in the philosophy of MacIntyre , who argues that each tradition seeks truth and that truth is an essential element of any tradition-constituted reason. MacIntyre rejects as false the objectivism/relativism disjunction that Richard Bernstein pointed out as underlying many contemporary discussions of relativism . MacIntyre escapes the objectivism/relativism dichotomy by focusing on epistemological crises. Finally, through an examination of Charles Taylor’s Gadamerian fusion of horizons, which he sees as a continuation of MacIntyre’s arguments , I show how traditions can learn from one another. The theory of substantive reason defends itself as a theory by which evaluations of reason and the good occur not only within but between traditions. It obviates the objectivism/relativism dichotomy by accepting the tradition-constitutive nature of reason—that is, recognizing both reason’s foundation in tradition and its capacity for evaluating the good and the standards of reason in a tradition. The discussion of truth and learning from proves essential for a critical theory of society, since such a theory must be able to make Beyond Relativism 173 truth claims about unjust, inhumane practices. That these claims are made from within a particular tradition should not undermine the critical potential of a theory of substantive reason. Further, that traditions can learn from one another through dialogue and thus morally advance makes such dialogue a useful tool for critical theorists, who can utilize it in progressive politics and ethics to advance human welfare in different concrete traditions. A theory of substantive reason, then, enables a critical theory of society to criticize existing forms of domination and power. The development of a tradition-constituted reason adds a greater urgency and thoroughness to an account of substantive reason: urgency because the theory shows how reason works...