Political Careers, Corruption, and Impunity: Panama's Assembly, 1984-2009

8. Personal Enrichment through Legal Means: Assembly Members' Wages in Comparative Perspective

Chapter 8 Personal Enrichment through Legal Means Assembly Members’ Wages in Comparative Perspective The establishment of democracy gives rise to certain expectations among the members of the political community. One is that action by government leaders be oriented toward some version of the public good (O’Donnell 1996), given that an intrinsic quality of the democratic regime as a political system is that it is completely (or almost completely) responsive to all its citizens (Dahl 1971, 2). Naturally, such a regime is an ideal type; absolute or near-absolute responsiveness, although possible conceptually, is materially unattainable. Even so, the democratic rhetoric—“government of the people, by the people, for the people”— legitimizes an ideal that, among other things, repudiates behavior by public officials oriented toward the satisfaction of private objectives. This universalistic expectation is embedded in a republican tradition with deep roots in Western political thinking. The moral philosophers of antiquity exalted civic virtue, which they understood as unselfish dedication to the res publica. Renaissance and Enlightenment thinkers identified patriotism, conceptualized as the suppression of personal ambition and unswerving devotion to the public welfare, as an essential element in maintaining a vigorous political regime. In The Spirit of the Laws Montesquieu (1748/1966) argued that sustaining the democratic regime 177 178 | Assembly Members’ Goals, Behaviors, and Activities required the prevalence of a generalized “sensation” of civic virtue among its members. These theoretical admonitions notwithstanding, behavior by public officials oriented toward private gain is present in all liberal democracies. There are, however, significant variations in the degree of particularism that different democratic regimes exhibit or tolerate. Clearly, there is less of it where a universalistic rule of law is strongly institutionalized—that is, where written laws are generally a reliable predictor of the behavior of political actors. Where corruption, impunity, and clientelism serve as better predictors of politicians’ behavior, a drive toward private gain is more evident in their actions. This is the first of three chapters focusing on private gain as a motivation for the actions of Panama’s deputies. Based on the premise that representatives are self-interested rational actors, getting rich may well be a reason for obtaining or maintaining an assembly seat. Analysts of representatives ’ behavior, however, have only mentioned this goal in passing. While “private gain” is one of five goals of representatives mentioned in his 1973 study of congressional committees, Fenno clarified on the book’s first page that this objective “will not be treated at all.” Mayhew (1974, 16)—another major theorist of representatives’ behavior— wrote that some members of the U.S. Congress may “try to get rich in office, a quest that may or may not interfere with reelection,” but he did not elaborate the idea further. Concerning politicians generally, Samuels (1998) observed that “many politicians may seek office for other reasons” than obtaining reelection, “such as promoting good policy or to become rich.” Despite these cursory references, the scholarship has not examined the private gain objective and its implications in sufficient depth. At least one analyst describes this as a potential weakness, for representatives “do their work within environments that are increasingly populated by the affluent—ranging from corporate executives to high-powered lobbyists to many wealthy peers with similar backgrounds and experiences” (Loomis 1994, 348). In the analysis of Panamanian deputies’ behavior from 1984 onwards, acquiring wealth emerges as an important motivation for seeking reelection . In 1999 an acute observer of Panamanian politics, former electoral tribunal member and supreme court magistrate César Quintero, explained the “excess” of assembly candidates principally as a function of the high salaries and ample prerogatives enjoyed by chamber members .1 This chapter situates the emoluments received by Panama’s assembly members in comparative perspective, showing how—according to various criteria—they are very well paid. As a result, obtaining and retaining a deputy’s seat constitute a legal means to securing and maintaining access to a high income. Assembly Members’ Wages For their services to the state, public officials, including representatives, should receive adequate compensation. In many countries the low remuneration received by officers of the state is frequently cited as an explanation for public sector corruption. In this context, increasing public officials’ salaries could be judged positively if the pay raise is meant to rectify income inequality and discourage illegal enrichment.2 If, however , wage structures are not based on merit...