Political Careers, Corruption, and Impunity: Panama's Assembly, 1984-2009

6. Political Advancement through Reelection: The Legal and Illegal Uses of Patronage

Chapter 6 Political Advancement through Reelection The Legal and Illegal Uses of Patronage Representatives in many democracies engage in patronage-related activities, such as securing the construction of public works in key localities and obtaining state funding for specific groups and projects in their constituencies. In this capacity, members of representative assemblies assume the role of intermediaries between the executive branch and their constituents in the process of allocating state resources. In the United States, for example, this activity—labeled “allocation responsiveness” by some and, more colloquially, “pork barrel” politics by others—takes up a substantial amount of representatives’ time and energy. Members of Congress introduce legislation to ensure that their districts receive “a fair share of government projects, programs, and expenditures” (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987, 3–4). Although it is undertaken with a clear electoral objective in mind, in most advanced democracies “allocation responsiveness” does not comprise direct access to constituency funds by representatives for the provision of goods and services to constituents with the express purpose of creating electoral clienteles. This is certainly not true in the United States and Great Britain, the cases studied by Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina in their 1987 discussion of allocation and service responsiveness. 131 132 | Assembly Members’ Goals, Behaviors, and Activities Once incumbents to the Panamanian assembly obtain nomination by a duly recognized political party, they may seek reelection. As predicted by legislators’ behavior theory, to aid their reelectoral ambitions Panamanian assembly members also resort to patronage. In Panama, however, patronage encompasses dimensions that the literature on legislators ’ behavior has not yet fully addressed. Members of the Panamanian assembly engage in a much more straightforward particularistic distribution of public goods and services with an unmistakable electoral connection in mind, and they use state resources to purchase political support in both legal and illegal ways. Legal Distribution of Patronage through Partidas Circuitales Partidas circuitales, or “constituency funds,” were budget funds assigned directly to legislators for discretionary use in their districts in 1985–87 and 1993–2001. Inspired by Panama’s clientelistic tradition, conceived toward the end of the old regime (1903–1968), instituted during the military regime (1968–89), revived—after the overthrow of the dictatorship—toward the end of the Endara administration (PPAN, 1989–94), and maximized during the government of Ernesto Pérez Balladares (PRD, 1994–99), partidas circuitales were a means that helped some Panamanian legislators surmount a low reelection rate. The rise in the availability of partidas circuitales was promoted by President Pérez Balladares in an attempt to render the assembly even less effective than prescribed by the Panamanian constitution. In this way, the president ensured the uncontested application of his agenda and legislators were guaranteed funding to cultivate electoral clienteles (Cochez 2000). The policy had adverse consequences for the democratic system, especially with regard to the balance of power, oversight of the government , and quality of representation. In the pursuit of the objectives of Pérez Balladares as well as of the members of Panama’s assembly, however , it proved successful. Old Republic Origins The practice of allocating “development” funds directly to representatives can be traced to the inception of the military dictatorship’s constitu- tion in 1972 (see chapter 2). Additional antecedents are found not only in the clientelistic approach to politics that was a legacy of the old regime (see chapter 4) but also in an initiative by assembly member Ovidio Díaz (1964–68, 1984–89), who in 1965 proposed the allocation of state resources directly to members of the assembly for the construction of public works (Pérez Jaramillo 2000). Ovidio Díaz was first elected deputy in 1964, on the Partido Republicano (PR) ticket, in representation of his native Los Santos Province. In an essay responding to heightened criticism of partidas circuitales, former assemblyman Díaz explained that the proposal was a reaction to his own disillusion “after I became aware of my incapacity to satisfy the most urgent basic needs of the community and my friends in the constituency who had faith and hope in my mandate.” As chairman of the assembly’s Public Works Committee, Ovidio Díaz secured the inclusion in the 1966 budget of a US$30,000 fund for each deputy, with the exception of two other members and Díaz himself who, as originator of the initiative, received a higher amount.1 In his account Díaz underscores the electoral connection implicit...