Political Careers, Corruption, and Impunity: Panama's Assembly, 1984-2009

5. Political Advancement through Reflection: Prospects and Possibilities in Panama

Chapter 5 Political Advancement through Reelection Prospects and Possibilities in Panama Theories of legislators’ behavior, built primarily on the U.S. experience, portray representatives as self-interest maximizers whose main goal is to secure reelection (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974). Fenno (1973, 1) initially suggested that members of the U.S. Congress are motivated by three basic goals (reelection, obtaining influence within the representative assembly , and formulating good public policy) and two additional objectives (pursuing higher office and securing private gain). Since the publication of Mayhew’s Congress: The Electoral Connection, the scholarship has considered representatives in the United States primarily as “singleminded seekers of reelection” (Mayhew 1974, 5). Indeed, between 1946 and 1998, an average of 92 percent of members of the House of Representatives and 83 percent of Senate incumbents sought reelection in each electoral cycle (Ornstein et al. 2000, 57–58). In 1982–2004 the averages were 91 and 81 percent, respectively (Renka 2007). The literature assumes that members of representative assemblies want reelection because they are interested in pursuing a political career . Within this framework, representatives are generally motivated by what Joseph Schlesinger (1966, 10) labeled “static ambition,” that is, a 117 118 | Assembly Members’ Goals, Behaviors, and Activities desire to build “a long-run career out of a particular office,” which theorists view as “a marked goal of many American [U.S.] congressmen and senators.” Satisfying this objective through a congressional seat has become increasingly possible, as demonstrated by the high reelection rates enjoyed by members of the U.S. Congress. “Over the course of the past 100 years,” wrote Loomis in 1998, “the Congress has developed into an institution that fosters long careers.” In the mid-1990s, approximately 15 percent of House members had served twenty years, and the average member had spent ten years in the lower chamber. In the Senate the average length of service was eleven years, or roughly two terms (Loomis 1998, 63). On average, 93 percent of the members of the House seeking reelection achieved their goal in 1964–2006. “Few things in life are more predictable than the chances of an incumbent member of the U.S. House of Representatives winning reelection,” claimed the Center for Responsive Politics. “With wide name recognition, and usually an insurmountable advantage in campaign cash, House incumbents typically have little trouble holding onto their seats.” For senators, the average in 1964–2006 was 82 percent—a somewhat lower percentage than for House members but still overwhelmingly in favor of incumbents (Center for Responsive Politics 2010). Reelection, therefore, permits the continued exercise of political office. In the United States it is a sine qua non for members of Congress motivated by static political ambition. A congressional seat guarantees a place in the public arena, gives representatives a role in decision making as well as in the allocation of resources, and assigns responsibility for policy making and oversight, all of which constitute important activities for building and maintaining political careers. As a result, Mayhew ’s assertion that “successful pursuit of a career requires continual reelection ” has become a fundamental premise of the literature on U.S. members’ behavior (Mayhew 1974, 15–16). This model travels well to other liberal democracies where there are no restrictions on the reelection of representatives and where an assembly seat actually provides interesting opportunities for career advancement (as it does in the United States). Recent studies have examined its applicability to other democratic states where reelection is forbidden or uncommon . Authors thus engaged have also started from the premise that representatives everywhere seek political advancement. They have concluded , however, that in countries where reelection is restricted—or where more attractive opportunities for pursuing advancement exist in arenas other than the deliberative assembly—representatives seek to advance their careers through appointment or election to other political offices or promotion within the party bureaucracy (Carey 1996; Jones 1998; Mainwaring 1999; Morgenstern 1998; Samuels 1998). In Costa Rica, for example, where the immediate reelection of deputies is forbidden, representatives endeavor to increase their standing with party leaders (particularly the presidential candidate) and their popularity with constituents in an attempt to maximize their chances of obtaining a political appointment in the ensuing term (Carey 1996, 94–101). In Argentina and Brazil, where unrestricted reelection is allowed , deputies frequently use their congressional experiences as “springboards ” to more politically gainful employment. After serving their terms in the congress, Argentine and Brazilian...