The Costs of Justice: How New Leaders Respond to Previous Rights Abuses

5. Poland

5 Poland Justice, Economics, and the End of Solidarity In 1989, following negotiations between members of the Communist Party and the Solidarity opposition movement, Poland became the first Eastern Bloc country to abandon communism. Between the 1989 semi-democratic elections and the 1991 free elections, post-Solidarity elites and postcommunist forces shared power. Since 1991, the two sides have taken turns running the country, with post-Solidarity elites dominating politics between 1991 and 1993 and from 1997 through 2001, and postcommunists controlling the government between 1993 and 1997 and from 2001 through 2005. For much of the postcommunist period, justice for communist-era rights violations has been an important, and highly charged, feature on the Polish political stage.Throughout this chapter, I refer to Poland’s oppositionera Solidarity leaders as “post-Solidarity” elites, though they have been represented in a variety of parties, beginning with the Civic Parliamentary Club (Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny, OKP), which was formed for the 1989 elections. Polish post-Solidarity elites, like their colleagues in much of Central Europe, faced two main transitional justice issues: communist-era violations and World War II atrocities.The latter issue was already on the agenda during the communist period, but there were, of course, limitations to 95 communist-era attempts to investigate wartime rights violations, since many violations were carried out by Soviet or Polish communist troops.1 As a result, post-Solidarity elites did make numerous attempts to deal with World War II violations, but they focused specifically on those abuses that took place toward the end of the war and were instigated by communists. In this way, the examination of wartime violations served as a natural bridge by which to explore the most recent period of abuse—the period in which many post-Solidarity elites were themselves victims. As in other parts of the communist world, the worst period of rights abuses in Poland occurred during Stalinism, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, when political imprisonment, torture, and state-sponsored killings took place regularly. During the post-Stalinist period beginning in 1956, core human rights abuses were generally less common, occurring in episodes rather than on an everyday basis. The events in Poznań in 1956, when scores of people were killed during the state’s operation to end strikes initiated by factory workers, marked the first and bloodiest period of episodic rights violations that took place throughout the 1980s. Other such violations , usually involving state security services who were shooting or attacking unarmed demonstrators, broke out in 1968, 1970, 1976, and at the start of martial law in 1981. While there were sporadic episodes of political imprisonment and even extrajudicial killings during these years, these problems escalated as the communist regime set about destroying the opposition Solidarity labor union. Under martial law (1981–1983), scores of oppositionists were killed and thousands were imprisoned. This pattern of political imprisonments and detentions continued throughout the 1980s, as Solidarity continued to function underground, until the government renewed negotiations with its leaders in 1988. In contrast to the other cases analyzed in this study, there was practically no foreign input (much less pressure) concerning transitional justice in Poland. Rather, justice was a phenomenon motivated by and primarily concerning post-Solidarity elites. Given the exclusively domestic nature of justice influences, the Polish case represents a straightforward test of the arguments posited here. Poland’s democratic breakthrough followed a negotiated transition between Solidarity activists and Communist Party leaders . As part of the settlement, former communists guaranteed themselves (or members of their former satellite parties) a place in the new government 96 | THE COSTS OF JUSTICE and 65 percent of seats in the primary, lower house of Parliament (Sejm). Post-Solidarity elites were left with 35 percent of the Sejm and almost total control (99/100 seats) in the freely contested, but secondary, upper house (Senat).The presidency initially remained in the hands of General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who ruled Poland during the 1980s; and several communist-era leaders served in key positions—including as defense minister, foreign minister , and internal affairs minister—in the post-Solidarity government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Finally, society was perceived to be split on the problem of how to deal with the past, with millions having been card-carrying members of the Communist Party. Under such conditions, and according to transition- and structurebased relative power arguments, Poland’s new elites might have been expected to act with...