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N O T E S Introduction 1. “Das wahre Judentum ist nirgend mehr, Schwärmerei und Aberglauben ist bei uns in der größten Abscheulichkeit. Wenn meine Nation nicht so dumm wäre, so würde sie mich wegen meines ‘Jerusalems’ steinigen, aber sie verstehen mich nicht.” Mendelssohn in conversation with Sophie Becker. See Becker, Briefe einer Kurländerin, 172ff.; New expanded edition: Vor hundert Jahren, 196 (November 27, 1785), 217–18, 225, 232–33. Partially quoted in BadtStrauss , Moses Mendelssohn. Zeugnisse, Briefe, Gespräche, 148–50. Translation according to Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study, 722. 2. Santayana, “Reason in Religion,” 180. 3. Cohen, Religion der Vernunft, 235. 4. This was formulated at the Second Council of Nicaea (787) and at the Council of Trent (1543). An extended and enlightening discussion (with rich documentation) can be found in On Holy Images, by St. John of Damascus (675–749). 5. Wolff, Philosophia practica universalis, vol. 2, § 441. Cf. Krochmalnik , “Das Zeremoniell als Zeichensprache,” 257–58. 6. Moses de León, Sefer ha-Rimmon, quoted in Matt, “The Mystic and the Mizwot,” 375. The article provides plenty of examples of blatant magical and theurgic and of course also anthropomorphic interpretations of the Mitsvot . See also Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, 397–98. The critic of the mystical view of the phylacteries supports Mendelssohn’s view that philosophy develops in its methods rather than in its content. 7. Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet II, 2, 1–2. 8. “Im Kult spricht und handelt der Mensch, aber auch Gott. Das kann nur geschehen, wenn göttliches und menschliches Handeln eine Gestalt bekommen, wenn es sichtbar, hörbar, tastbar wird. Und dies ist nur möglich mittels eines dritten, das von der Welt ist, aber im Kult geheiligt und aus der Welt genommen wird. Wir nennen dieses dritte: Symbol, nicht in dem abgeschw ächten, modernen Sinn des Wortes, sondern in dem echten, antiken: im Symbol fallen zwei wirklichkeiten zusammen, begegnen Gott und Mensch 247 248 Notes to Pages 7–10 einander.” Van der Leeuw, Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Religion, 189, cited in Hubbeling, “Der Symbolbegriff bei Gerardus van der der Leeuw,” 29. 9. See van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence and Manifestation, 448. Friedrich Theodor Vischer already defined the religious symbol as “mistaking the symbol for the thing” [signified] and maintained that it is essential to religion. Like van der Leeuw, he, too, adduces the Eucharist as the example of a religious symbol. See Vischer, “Das Symbol,” 159. Halbertal and Margalit, Idolatry, 40 (without reference to van der Leeuw), refer to icons only. “Not mere transparent signs, icons have independent power; they heal and perform miracles and therefore are addressed and worshiped. Their unique power is due not to the identity between God and the material makeup of the icon, but to the special relationship between the two. . . . The icon also shares some of the features of the thing it represents. . . . Thus there is a ‘substitution ’ in idol worship of the symbol for the thing symbolized, in which some of the traits of the symbolized thing are transferred to the symbolizing thing.” The conceptions above share one deficit in my view. They identify the modes of representation with kinds of signs. However, most signs signify in more than one mode. Moreover, I will argue below that exactly this ambiguity is essential to religion and idolatry. 10. “Rambaman” is an acronym for “Rabbi Moshe ben Menachem,” i.e., the son of Mendel, i.e., Mendels-Sohn. “Rambam” is an acronym for “Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon,” i.e., the son of Maimon, i.e., Maimonides. Mendelssohn once rendered Maimonides’ name “Maimonsohn.” 11. In 1854 Hirsch published an attack on the term “Ceremonialgesetze,” which allegedly Mendelssohn coined for the religious law, and attacked Mendelssohn himself without naming him. The name of the person who coined the expression (i.e., Mendelssohn—or Spinoza?), says Hirsch, should flourish as long as there are Jews “who violate their most holy duties.” This term “gnaws away the entire holiness of our religious law.” The “natural consequence” of its usage is that one may abstain from observing it. See “Die jüdischen Ceremonialgesetze ,” 70, 72, 71. The essay was reprinted as the first issue of the series Schriften des Vereins zur Erhaltung des überlieferten Judentums. In Jeschurun 2, no. 12 (September 1857): 615–30, the first essay in a long series of Hirsch’s “Jewish Symbolism” appeared under the title “Grundlinien einer jüdischen Symbolik,” which...

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