The View from Within: Normativity and the Limits of Self-Criticism

Chapter 3. Factuality without Realism: Normativity and the Davidsonian Approach to Meaning

CHAPTER THREE Factuality without Realism Normativity and the Davidsonian Approach to Meaning The Argument The restricted version of normative relativism presented in the previous chapter was argued for on the basis of two main premises: acknowledgment of the phenomenon of Normative Diversity and commitment to a community-based approach to meaning. The aim of the present chapter is to argue that despite his decidedly non-community-based approach to concepts and properties, and opposition to the very idea of a diversity of reason-giving conceptual schemes (normative or other), Davidson’s theory of meaning fares no better than the opposition. Not only does it not provide a safeguard against Normative Diversity,but,we shall argue,it turns out that from a Davidsonian standpoint, not only is normative factuality compatible with Comparative Normative Irrealism, but on the assumption that radically different conceptions of the good life indeed exist, normative factuality in fact leads to Comparative Normative Irrealism. To recall,the version of Normative Irrealism of which we speak maintains that in comparing conflicting and fully fledged coherent normative outlooks, people commit themselves to nonexistent normative comparative properties.It thus denies the existence of the possibility of a normative ranking of maximally coherent systems of values acceptable to both. The 56 argument we shall present—this time from a Davidsonian perspective— is, again, that rather than lead us to deny the factuality of normative discourse , Normative Diversity should lead us to deny its realistic character. Obviously, for many of Davidson’s readers such a claim will come as a surprise. On the standard reading, supported by some of his own texts, Davidson himself would seem to reject the very idea of Normative Diversity . If a normative outlook is understandable (by us), it cannot be radically different (from our own). Susan Hurley expresses this conviction thus: Alternative reason giving concepts . . . must be local alternatives; we cannot make sense of the possibility of an entirely alien scheme of reasons for action, without losing our grip on the very idea of intentional action. To be a reason for action is just to be one of our reasons, related to one another in roughly the ways they are.1 Let us say at the outset, what we shall be presenting is a Davidsonian approach to normativity rather than an attempt to account for Davidson ’s own views on the matter. Having said that, however, we do insist that although Davidsonians will not allow radically different conceptual schemes, they should allow radically different theoretical conceptions of the world and (analogously) radically different conceptions of the good life. But we shall be arguing from within the Davidsonian framework for more: not merely for the possibility, but the inevitability of normative (and theoretical) diversity. This combination of diversity and factuality will form the first component of our argument for Comparative Normative Irrealism with regard to the thin. The other crucial element of our argument draws on Davidson’s theory of meaning. In some of his writings Davidson famously develops an idiolect-based conception of meaning. One essential element of this conception comes down to the following. For the individual speaker to possess a concept is for him to have the capacity to apply it correctly in “normal” cases. Failure can be attributed only to ignorance of relevant facts, a failure to reason something through, or some other sort of defect or disorder such as stupidity,confusion,or illness.The individual speaker’s coherence in applying a concept and his having all the information he Factuality without Realism 57 takes to be relevant guarantee the truth of the application. It follows, we shall argue, that to concede Normative Diversity implies that two con- flicting, yet fully coherent, conceptions of the good life held by different people must both be true. In skeleton form, the argument runs as follows: (i) Normative Diversity: Conflicting conceptions of the good life can be radically different from each other. (ii) Factuality: (And yet) normative discourse is factual (truth apt). (iii) Idiolect-Based Conception of Meaning: Coherence (in a very broad sense) and full information of the individual speaker in applying a concept guarantee the truth of its application. From which follows, we shall argue: (iv) Normative Irrealism: Since conflicting conceptions of the good life can all be true, there can be no one normative order that ranks them. Our further objective is to show that from within a Davidsonian framework...