Bitter Knowledge: Learning Socratic Lessons of Disillusion and Renewal

3: The Poverty of Socratic Questioning

83 t h r e e The Poverty of Socratic Questioning Asking and Answering in the Meno I understand [philosophy] as a willingness to think not about something other than what ordinary human beings think about, but rather to learn to think undistractedly about things that ordinary human beings cannot help thinking about, or anyway cannot help having occur to them, sometimes in fantasy, sometimes as a flash across a landscape. . . . Such thoughts are instances of that characteristic human willingness to allow questions for itself which it cannot answer with satisfaction. Cynics about philosophy, and perhaps about humanity, will find that questions without answers are empty; dogmatists will claim to have arrived at answers; philosophers after my heart will rather wish to convey the thought that while there may be no satisfying answers to such questions in certain forms, there are, so to speak, directions to answers, ways to think, that are worth the time of your life to discover. (It is a further question for me whether directions of this kind are teachable, in ways suited to what we think of as schools.) —stanley cavell Many people have noted the philosophical richness of the Meno, with its compressed treatment of a host of interesting topics. For example, in the Library of Liberal Arts edition, Fulton Anderson begins his 84 – bitter knowledge Introduction to the dialogue with words of praise: “The Meno is described by Walter Pater as the ‘most characteristic dialogue of Plato.’ John Stuart Mill calls it a ‘gem’ among Platonic works, and most aptly, for in no other dialogue of Plato are there exhibited within comparable compass so many facets as the Meno contains” [Jowett & Anderson at 7]. Given its richness and its compression of topics, we can in this chapter continue to pursue a number of questions that we began to investigate in studying the Protagoras. How does anyone become good? Do we become virtuous or excellent because we are born that way, or because we are educated to be good? And, if it is a matter of being taught, who teaches virtue to us? Also, what is the basis or foundation of virtue? Is being good based on knowledge in some way, or is virtue a matter of having true beliefs, correct opinions? Is it mere luck, or is virtue a matter of inspiration, divine or otherwise? Socrates in the Meno does not know the answers to these questions. But, since he is possessed by these questions, perhaps even obsessed with them, he will not let them go unanswered. Or, rather, he does not fail to try to answer them—if, that is, they have an answer. So, as Stanley Cavell suggests in the epigraph to this chapter, “while there may be no satisfying answers to such questions in certain forms, there are, so to speak, directions to answers, ways to think, that are worth the time of your life to discover.” What the nature of virtue is or may be, and whether it is possible to teach people virtue, are among the concerns that Socrates and Meno and we investigate in the Meno, without knowing how our search for an answer may end. It is an unpredictable inquiry that is portrayed in this dialogue. The Meno’s Progress and Meno’s Progress The dialogue opens with a long discussion between Socrates and Meno; then it shifts to a much shorter exchange between Socrates and Meno’s slave, and this exchange is itself briefly interrupted by a short talk again between Socrates and Meno. When Socrates finishes with Meno, he once more turns his attention to the slave; and then, when Socrates finishes with him, another brief conversation occurs between Socrates The Poverty of Socratic Questioning – 85 and Meno. This exchange also is interrupted, when Anytus appears and proceeds to discuss certain matters with Socrates. The dialogue then concludes with yet another extended discussion between Socrates and Meno. The conversational movement of the Meno can be outlined this way: • Socrates and Meno [pp. 23–38 (70a–82b)] • Socrates and the Slave [pp. 38–41 (82b–84a)] • Interlude: Socrates and Meno [pp. 41–42 (84a–d)] • Socrates and the Slave [pp. 42–43 (84d–85b)] • Socrates and Meno [pp. 43–49 (85b–89c)] • Socrates and Anytus [pp. 49–54 (89d–95a)] • Socrates and Meno [pp. 55–61 (95a–100b)] This synoptic outline suggests that Meno is the chief character of this drama. We see...