The Writings of Charles De Koninck: Volume 2

CONCEPT, PROCESS, AND REALITY

C, P,  R MN  DeKoninck-10 5/13/09 3:57 PM Page 405 DeKoninck-10 5/13/09 3:57 PM Page 406 MN It is taken for granted that Thomistic doctrine can neither assimilate, nor account for, one of the most fundamental ideas of philosophy,which modern thought, since Nicholas of Cusa, has set in bold relief: the idea of process extended to otherwise irreducible natures. Most modern philosophers would agree with the late Ernst Cassirer’s statement of our problem: Aristotle’s logic is unexcelled in the precise working out of contradictions , in setting up the categories by which the classes of being are distinguished. But it is unable to overcome this opposition between the various classes of being; it does not press on to their real point of unification . Hence it remains caught in the empirical and the finite; it is unable to rise to a truly speculative interpretation of the universe. The physical universe of Aristotle is dominated by the opposition between “the straight” and “the curved”; motion in straight lines and motion in circles are for him essentially and radically distinct. But the transition to the infinitely large and the infinitely small shows that this is a matter not of an absolute but of a relative distinction. The circle with an infinite radius coincides with the straight line; the infinitely small arc is indistinguishable from its chord.1 If the unification referred to by the author were understood as accomplished identity, there could be no compromise. For, at infinity, straight would have to be, in the same respect, non-straight. We are not concerned, at present, with the philosophers who accept this contradiction. We merely wish to point out that the irrevocable opposition between the two conceptions illustrated by the passage quoted from Cassirer arises only when we cease to understand“at infinity”as the limit of unending process. While the convergent series is fixed once and for all by a definite law which holds for all possible values of the series, a smallest or a greatest possible value is impossible ; nor is the limit itself a possible value. The very law precludes this possibility; for what it guarantees is convergence toward, not attainment of, the limit. Nor could the law be fixed and definite as it is if the variable and  DeKoninck-10 5/13/09 3:57 PM Page 407 the limit were not irreducibly distinct, or if there were a smallest possible difference to keep them apart. At first glance, this qualification might be interpreted as a rejection of the very idea of process associated with formally distinct natures; yet I venture the opinion that the very idea of process depends upon it. No one will deny that the definition of a term as the limit of a process is a decisive achievement, however well this term may already be known in itself . Not only does it bring out an otherwise unknown relatedness of formally distinct natures: it also implies a peculiar unity in the very mode of knowing the one and the other. In fact, it is precisely because we naturally seek a more unified mode of knowing that, when faced with natures related as variable and limit, we are urged to“press on to their real point of unification.”But the problem is: does the tendency toward unification in the mode of knowing arise from an actual identity of the objects known? The problem of the One and the Many is usually confined to the manner in which things in themselves are one and many. Yet there is also a question of a One and Many with regard to the cognitive means by which we reach what we know. The latter (we shall call it the noetic as opposed to the natural problem) is amply treated by St.Thomas who,in this connection,draws from Platonic, and more particularly from Neo-Platonic sources. His teaching on this subject is as follows.2 For each object distinctly known we require a distinct means of knowing. Thus, the concept by which we reach the object “circle”is other than that by which we attain“triangle.”It is true that both objects may be known simultaneously by some common concept such as that of figure, but the genus “figure” cannot represent them distinctly. Whenever, by means of one concept, we actually consider many objects, we inevitably do so at the...