The Writings of Charles De Koninck: Volume 2

PART TWO The Principle of the New Order

   The Principle of the New Order This is not the wisdom that descends from above. It is earthly, sensual, devilish. —James : But the good angels, in knowing a creature, do not fix on it, since this would be to darken and become night, but refer it to the praise of God, in whom as in their cause they know all things. —Ia, q. , a. , ad  And the angel, in knowing himself, does not dwell on himself, as if enjoying and placing his end in himself—for thus would night come to be, as with the angels who sinned—but refers his knowledge to the praise of God. —Q.D. de veritate, q. , a. , a.  The program lists “Philosophy and Order in International Relations” as the subject of this paper.74 Actually I was asked to present to you as a subject for discussion the problem of “Metaphysics and International Order.” Although the problem of international order properly concerns political science and prudence—of the speculative sciences, philosophy of nature would be closer to it than metaphysics—it is significant that the most radical philosophy of international revolution has always been careful to point out that traditional metaphysics is its absolute contrary.75 The philosophy of revolution has well understood that metaphysics takes upon itself the defense of first principles and that it is the science which leads us most properly to things naturally more noble and more divine than man. And this clearly has implications for a world order among nations. The aim of revolutionary philosophy, on the contrary, is not international order in the strict sense of the word, but rather a universal order in which man in a state of privation,  DeKoninck-02 5/13/09 3:53 PM Page 109 both material and spiritual,is the radical and necessary principle.The present discussion will be confined to this fundamental, although restricted, aspect of the problem. Negation of the Primacy of the Speculative Modern philosophers, despite their apparent differences, generally agree that metaphysics or speculative wisdom, inasmuch as it chiefly considers things better than man,estranges man from his true self and power and consequently is destructive of human nature and among the great enemies of mankind.Because it is in its way superhuman, it is thought anti-human, distracting man from the total effort in which he should be engaged to conquer the earth and respond to his desire to live.76 It is destructive of human nature and must consequently be counted among mankind’s greatest enemies. And, indeed, as Aristotle says in the Ethics, if man were the best thing in the universe, political science and prudence, not speculative wisdom, would be the best knowledge.77 Let us, then, consider the hypothesis that political science and prudence are the best knowledge and see what follows rigorously from it. The first and more general consequence is that things would be merely what we should wish them to be. Political science and prudence are practical in that they direct toward an end, according to right reason. But this presupposes that we know the nature of that which is to be directed and of the end, in other words, the rectitude of practical regulation presupposes the rectification of the speculative intellect.78 Therefore, if, per impossibile, practical regulation were independent of speculative truth, then what things are or should be, such as man, society, and the human good, would be merely what we wished them to be. Practical science would no longer even be a science . Simple practical knowledge would no longer be truly practical. All direction would be by chance and would no longer be direction. The hypothesis also implies specifically the negation of prudence itself. One might argue that, since in practical things the end is the principle, and since the artisan chooses the end he desires to realize—this kind of house, and this one rather than that one—we are free to choose the end. But art and prudence differ in this respect, for prudence does not choose the end  | Charles De Koninck DeKoninck-02 5/13/09 3:53 PM Page 110 but only the means. If prudence chose the end, like art it could not choose the means, and thus it would be one with art. And if this were so, the truth of the prudential judgment would not depend upon the rectitude of the appetite with respect to the...