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Chapter Eleven: Citizen Insecurity and Democracy Reflections on a Paradoxical Configuration
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c ha p t e r e l ev e n Citizen Insecurity and Democracy Reflections on a Paradoxical Configuration l aurence whitehead In the 1970s and 1980s—and earlier in Central America—military and authoritarian rule became widely associated by local and outside observers alike with the abolition of basic civil and political liberties and the systematic violations of human rights. These came to be perceived by many as the décadas negras of torture and disappearance, and of the politics of fear that shrunk the public arena to a bare minimum. Dictatorship may have restored order to polarized societies, but for the majority of citizens the price was finally deemed too high, and the slogan that marked the end of this period was Nunca Más! With the return to democracy, human rights organizations—which, in the absence of political parties as the once dominant conduits between state and society and often aided by churches, had become the only voice of protest against authoritarianism in many countries—initially turned their attention to the past, campaigning for accountability and “truth telling” about the human rights violations of the authoritarian period. 277 278 Laurence Whitehead But it was not long before it became apparent that the present and future were as much, if not more, of a challenge as backward looking accountability and justice. Democracy had not simply and reliably established institutions and values that guaranteed the protection of human rights. In some countries, such as Brazil, human rights violations actually increased after the demise of authoritarianism. For some sections of the electorate, and in some localities, the authoritarian past came to be remembered in a more favorable light, by contrast with subsequent experiences . At least for those who stayed away from political protest, the past could be reimagined as a period of order and security. In consequence , some politicians and parties with clear ties to the repressive past could hope to prosper in democratic elections by capitalizing on their reputations for imposing effective disciplines. It also became clear that democratic government, allied with the universal precepts of economic liberalism, was not, in Latin America, creating a virtuous circle of greater wealth and distribution. The application of the wisdom of the Washington Consensus may have stabilized inflation and introduced game rules that are more predictable for foreign investors , benefiting the population insofar as the elimination of acute instability helps ordinary people to plan their lives and manage their households. But liberalization as applied in the region was creating many more millionaires than it was contributing to increase the ranks of the middle classes. One estimate is that the per capita product received by the richest fifth of the region’s population is more than eighteen times the product received by the poorest fifth, compared with a worldwide average of about seven to one, and an average for all developing countries of about eight to one.1 Other comparative figures and new time series suggest that Latin American democracies are not likely to bring the region back into a more normal range of income or asset distribution within the near future. So, if economic liberalization was deemed necessary to ensure competitive insertion into the “global economy,” it is proving to be a less than adequate tool to address the dislocations produced by long term structural transformations such as urbanization, youth unemployment, shifting family structures, and the fragmentation and even destruction of traditional community structures of solidarity—all phenomena associated with rising crime rates and citizen insecurity. Indeed, increased social spending and state intervention to “control” the undesirable side- [18.232.188.122] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 16:53 GMT) Citizen Insecurity and Democracy 279 effects of such processes seemed to be incompatible with the strict disciplines demanded by the new liberalism. Thus, just as Francis Fukuyama announced the “end of history,” the weight of history began to make itself felt with a vengeance in a newly democratized Latin America: poverty and inequality, embedded undemocratic political cultural traditions and mechanisms of power mediation, and institutional habits inherited from a long history of formalism unmatched by de facto implementation and follow through are blocking even the best designed institutional reforms in the region. The region-wide shift to civilian constitutional governments with competitive elections and freedom of expression has generated significant desencanto rather than adherence to a positive, consensual notion of the kind of democracy societies wanted, and how to achieve it: nunca más was followed by an ahora qué? There...