In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

After reading the comments by Vargas and by Chapman and Cunningham, we find it is necessary to make some clarifications. The authors of both reviews provide useful insight into issues of free will as they pertain to the fields of philosophy (Vargas) and psychology (Chapman and Cunningham ). We find that although the authors admittedly agree with parts of our chapter, we will follow their lead and focus only on points of disagreement or those necessary of clarification. In our response, we will argue that points made counter to our argument may, upon closer examination, be used in support of our thesis that the exploration of issues of free will may be hindered by group processes when academics are motivated by different rewards. In our chapter, we argue that groups are formed around common philosophical ideas, one of which may be position on questions about whether free will exists. In academia, there may exist some fields that may lean more toward one point of view—some more toward a deterministic view and others more toward a free will view. In his reply, Vargas enlightens the reader with one of the basic principles “discussed in nearly any introductory textbook on free will”—that of compatibilism . The reader learns that this philosophical position states that one can have free will even if determinism is true. Unfortunately Vargas wrongly assumes that we “presume the falsity of compatibilism.” We make it clear that although there are definitely variations in (1) the extent to which an individual field supports a particular position as a whole and (2) the extent to which individuals within a field support the group’s leanings, we were only going to be talking about the “ideal” group members—those who strongly identify with a philosophical position in the free will debate (paragraph 2 of our chapter). We recognize the possibilities of compatibilism —that believing in determinism does not necessarily rule out free will. Although we are not necessarily commenting on the actual existence of free will or determinism, as Vargas suggests, we are focusing on the position 10.3 Extreme Group Membership Frames the Debate Victoria K. Lee and Lasana T. Harris 414 Victoria K. Lee and Lasana T. Harris individuals may have in this debate and the effects these identities may have on the formation of academic collaborations and growth. We believe that positions in this debate can fall anywhere on a continuum from those who believe wholeheartedly in determinism to those who believe solely in free will. In our interpretation, compatibilists would lie somewhere in the middle of this continuum, believing in both free will and determinism. Ironically, self-identified compatibilists may themselves form another group whose position at times may run counter to either determinists or free will advocates .1 In our discussion, we do not focus on these compatibilists, but as noted above, focus on the “ideal” group members at the extreme ends of the continuum. Another necessary point of clarification surrounds our use of examples in support of academic groups formed based on philosophical position. Vargas writes “there is no reason for thinking that many, perhaps even any, disciplines are unified by specific views about free will.” He goes on to use philosophy as a “notorious case” in which “there is no convergence among philosophers in favor of any particular view about free will.” We find it curious of Vargas to cite the field from which this debate stems. In our opinion this logic is problematic: To say that the philosophical debate on free will does not produce “convergence among philosophers” on topics of free will should be inherent in the term “philosophical debate.” Moreover , philosophers regularly divide themselves into subgroups based on their epistemic beliefs. Philosophers aside, many other academic groups do cling to a position advocated by their field. Turning to the criticism of our examples, we feel it appropriate to describe legal scholars as endorsing free will and scientists as more deterministic . Remember we are only talking about the “ideal” group members, those on the extreme ends of the free will–determinism continuum. While we know that many legal scholars may fall somewhere more toward the center of this continuum, any legal scholar could not rule out the possibility of free will in this debate. After all, how can a man be convicted of a crime if he had no part in the execution of the crime? If free will does not exist, the defendant was nothing more than a vehicle, an empty body...

Share