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17 - The Dialectics of Dis/Unity in the Evolutionary Synthesis and Its Extensions
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17 The Dialectics of Dis/Unity in the Evolutionary Synthesis and Its Extensions Werner Callebaut I believe one can divide men into two principal categories; those who suffer the tormenting desire for unity, and those who do not. —George Sarton (quoted in Sarton 1959: 40–41) The thesis of my contribution is that the evolution of evolutionary thinking (Hull 1988) since the making of the Modern Synthesis has been characterized by simultaneous unifying and disunifying tendencies, with no end in sight. This should be unsurprising, if not trivial, were it not for the claims of some postmodernists that unity is an ideological aberration, whereas disunity is welcome and real. This chapter elaborates on this theme and proposes a dialectical solution. “The work of defending, expanding, challenging, and, perhaps, replacing the Modern Synthesis,” Grene and Depew (2004: 248) observe, “has tended to bring out the philosopher in many evolutionary biologists.” The “Darwin industry” has also attracted to the scene professional philosophers , whose efforts to clarify key concepts and inferential patterns have stimulated the formation of a professional philosophy of biology, which is now booming (Hull 2000). Are there genuine laws (i.e., universal , nomically necessary generalizations) in biology? How can evolutionary biology be explanatory if it is not usually predictive?1 Answers to these and related questions have a direct bearing on any synthetic project. Beyond such philosophical concerns, calls for an extended or expanded Evolutionary Synthesis or “theory” (e.g., Gould 1982; Wicken 1987; Depew and Weber 1994; Odling-Smee et al. 2003; Kutschera and Niklas 2004; Jablonka and Lamb 2007; Müller 2007; Pigliucci 2007), if not for a “new,” or even a “post-Darwinian,” Synthesis (e.g., Wilson 1975; Carroll 2000; Johnson and Porter 2001; West-Eberhard 2003; Gilbert 2006; Rose and Oakley 2007), invite critical historical and sociological reflection on the rhetorical functions of discourse invoking “synthesis,” “extension,” and related terms. 444 Werner Callebaut The Rhetoric of Unification In a review of recent work on niche construction (see chapter 8 in this volume),Okasha (2005:10) writes approvingly that unlike certain authors who have called for “a major reorientation or re-structuring of evolutionary theory,” Odling-Smee et al. provide “positive and practical suggestions ” for how other researchers can put their ideas into practice.The would-be revolutionary whom Okasha targets is Stephen Jay Gould, whose initial dissenting attitude vis-à-vis the Synthesis, it should be noted, grew milder over the years: Gould (2002: 1003) contended only that “the synthesis can no longer assert full sufficiency to explain evolution at all scales” (see also Eldredge 1985), specifying that punctuated equilibrium was formulated as “the expected macroevolutionary extension of conventional allopatric speciation.” Perhaps already forgotten is that Edward O. Wilson was, in comparison, a far greater heretic, or at least tried hard to be perceived as such. His Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975: 64) envisioned the development of a “stoichiometry” of social evolution—a theory that can predict particular biological events in ecological and evolutionary time. This task Wilson regarded as so formidable that it would require “such profound changes in attitude and working methods that it can rightfully be called post-Darwinism” (my emphasis). Julie Klein (1990) pointed out that metaphors used to describe relations between scientific areas are typically drawn from geopolitics. Disciplines, domains, or fields are characterized as “territories” with “boundaries” that are to be “protected” and “crossed.” Development in the early decades of the previous century has been characterized as an “uncharted swamp” that was to be “bypassed” (Hull 1998a: 89). Lindley Darden, in a meta-analysis of “fields” that originated as part of an effort to promote “unifying science without reduction” (Maull 1977), defines a scientific field in terms of a central problem; a domain to be explained; techniques and methods, unique to it or shared with other fields; concepts , laws, and theories; special vocabulary; and more general assumptions and goals more or less shared by those scientists using the techniques in trying to solve the central problem (Darden 1991: 19). I have found Darden’s and Maull’s notion of interfield a useful tool to come to grips with the convergence of evolutionary and developmental biology resulting in EvoDevo. EcoDevo (Gilbert and Epel 2009), evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter 1982), and evolutionary or “Darwinian” medicine (e.g., Stearns and Koella 2008), can be regarded [3.230.76.153] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 11:56 GMT) The Dialectics of Dis/Unity 445 as similar mergers...