In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

5 Color within an Internalist Framework: The Role of “Color” in the Structure of the Perceptual System Rainer Mausfeld Color is, according to prevailing orthodoxy in perceptual psychology, a kind of autonomous and unitary attribute. It is regarded as unitary or homogeneous by assuming that its core properties do not depend on the type of “perceptual object” to which it pertains and that “color per se” constitutes a natural attribute in the functional architecture of the perceptual system. It is regarded as autonomous by assuming that it can be studied in isolation of other perceptual attributes. These assumptions also provide the pillars for the technical field of colorimetry, and have proved very fruitful for neurophysiological investigations into peripheral color coding. They also have become, in a technology-driven cultural process of abstraction, part of our commonsense conception of color. With respect to perception theory, however, both assumptions are grossly inadequate, on empirical and theoretical grounds. Classical authors, such as David Katz, Karl Bühler, Adhémar Gelb, Ludwig Kardos, and Kurt Koffka, were keenly aware of this and insisted that inquiries into color perception cannot be divorced from general inquiries into the structure of the conceptual forms underlying perception. All the same, the idea of an internal homogeneous and autonomous attribute of color per se, mostly taken not as an empirical hypothesis but as a kind of truism, became a guiding idea in perceptual psychology. Here, it has impeded the identification of relevant theoretical issues and consequently has become detrimental for the development of explanatory frameworks for the role of ‘color’ within the structure of our perceptual system. The concept of ‘color per se’ as an abstract attribute that can be dealt with in a decontextualized way has been developed, in the technological context of coloration techniques and dyeing processes, as the basis for standardizations and norms for capturing color appearances.1 The idea of ‘color per se’ is, thus, the product of technology-shaped cultural abstractions, including its corollary ideas that color can be characterized by basic color attributes, such as hue, saturation, and brightness, and that color appearances can be represented by a three-dimensional color space.2 These technology-driven abstractions capture a certain part of our exceedingly complex linguistic usage of color expressions in everyday language and have in turn shaped our 124 Rainer Mausfeld ordinary conception of color. However, they do not mirror core properties and principles of the internal organization of color in the perceptual system and, in the context of perception theory, have generated all sorts of spurious questions, such as about the types of “basic color attributes” or the dimensionality of color space. I have dealt in detail with these issues and the relevant empirical evidence elsewhere (Mausfeld 1998, 2003a). Here, it may suffice to point out the gross empirical inadequacy, even in center-surround situations, of the idea that color appearances can be represented by a three-dimensional color space.3 Its inappropriateness should already be evident from many classical experiments and observations, for instance, Katz’s demonstrations of the (at least) bi-dimensionality of achromatic colors. The assumption of threedimensionality was experimentally tested and shown to be inappropriate in an experiment by Ekroll et al. (2002).4 Furthermore, Niederée (this volume) rigorously shows that even in center-surround configurations, the dimensionality of color codes must be greater than three if one is willing to accept the topological assumptions that, at least implicitly, underlie almost all models of color coding. This empirical and theoretical evidence against the three-dimensionality of color already indicates that the traditional concept of color is flawed in a fundamental way. Although the entire conceptual framework underlying the idea of a homogeneous and autonomous attribute of color per se has been radically called into question in the earlier literature, it turned into orthodoxy during the first decades of the last century and, since then, is considered a natural and almost compulsory point of departure for dealing with color within perception theory. Why, then, do corresponding conceptions of color as an autonomous and unitary attribute still pervade perceptual psychology, despite the huge amount of evidence to the contrary? It seems mainly due to the influence of commonsense conceptions of perception, which we illegitimately transfer to scientific inquiry. Of course, all fields of scientific inquiry must inevitably start at their origin from everyday experiences and available commonsense concepts. In the process of their development, however, they have to go beyond commonsense conceptions...

Share