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7 An Obligation Not to Procreate? If David Benatar were correct that for every single person it is better never to come into existence, then there would be a strong reason for believing that we always have an obligation not to procreate. I have shown that Benatar’s theory does not stand up against a variety of criticisms. Nonetheless, other important moral reasons may count against having children. In investigating these reasons, I consider whether and when a case can be made that there is an obligation not to have children. James Lenman writes, “We might well believe that in every generation very many people will lead lives of at best highly compromised happiness and some people will lead quite terrible lives. Nonetheless our interest in having children is such that we may find the risk acceptable” (2004b, 147). The question is whether we are morally justified in finding that risk “acceptable” and to whom it ought to be acceptable. It’s not clear whether Lenman’s “we” means—or should mean—individual prospective parents, society at large, or even the children themselves. Perhaps no one should blithely endorse creating serious risks that others will have to run. It might be thought that my defense of the right to reproduce in the negative sense—that is, the entitlement not to be interfered with in reproduction —means there cannot be an obligation not to procreate. But that would be a mistake. We sometimes have a moral responsibility not to exercise a right. For example, the right to free speech does not give us a moral entitlement to say whatever we want whenever we want, for we sometimes have a moral obligation to keep our mouths shut. If I have promised to honor a secret you have told me, my right to free speech does not obliterate my moral obligation not to gossip about you. Similarly, although we have a right not to be interfered with in procreation—not 118 Chapter 7 to have others intervene in our sexual lives, not to be coerced to use contraception , not to be compelled to undergo forced sterilization or abortion —it does not follow that all our decisions to procreate are necessarily morally justified. It is possible that sometimes at least it is morally wrong to procreate, and we may sometimes have an obligation not to. Before examining the various reasons that might be given to support an obligation not to procreate, let’s consider what such an obligation would and would not mean in practice. In speaking of a possible obligation not to have children, I am saying nothing about what the state should or should not do to curtail procreation. That is a matter of social policy, which I am setting aside in this book. Instead, what I’m interested in here is the possibility of a moral responsibility to limit one’s own reproductive activities and outcomes. If there is ever an obligation not to procreate, it is plausible to suppose that it would mean in practice a moral responsibility to use safe and highly effective contraception when engaged in activities with a chance of resulting in pregnancy. It might also mean a responsibility on a woman’s part to obtain an abortion if she becomes pregnant. But it is less plausible to say that an obligation not to procreate requires behavior so onerous as to make one’s life miserable. For example, because almost all people enjoy sexual activity, and because sexuality is a crucial aspect of a good human life for most people, it seems unjust to say that an individual’s obligation not to procreate might mean in practice a blanket prohibition on (hetero)sexual activity for all the years that the individual is fertile. For the most part, people (of whatever sexual identity) cannot be expected to give up sex. But there are, of course, many ways of being sexually active, and some run no risk of pregnancy. Thus, if no effective and safe methods of contraception were available, then an individual who has an obligation not procreate would be morally required to avoid heterosexual activities likely to result in pregnancy. In addition, it may be too much to say that an obligation not to procreate requires sterilization at the beginning of one’s reproductive life. Giving up one’s fertility forever is too high a cost, unless the harms to the children who would otherwise be created are so horrific as to make their lives not worth...

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