Against Moral Responsibility

Preface

Preface Against Moral Responsibility is an assault on the moral responsibility system: a system that is profoundly entrenched in our society and its institutions, deeply rooted in our emotions, and vigorously defended by philosophers from Aristotle to the present day. Such an assault might seem foolhardy, or at best quixotic. But in fact, the results from extensive psychological, sociological, and biological studies have caused major problems for defenders of moral responsibility, and there are serious flaws in the moral responsibility system. Furthermore, the philosophical defenders of moral responsibility—though they are numerous, imaginative, insightful, and committed—are in no position to offer a unified defense of the moral responsibility citadel. Instead, in their reactions to the scientific advances challenging the moral responsibility system, philosophers have proposed a great variety of different and conflicting defenses of moral responsibility. There is such controversy among the defenders of moral responsibility that moral responsibility abolitionists might carry the day by sitting back safely while the defenders demolish one another’s arguments. The basic claim of this book is that—all the extraordinary and creative efforts of contemporary philosophers notwithstanding—moral responsibility cannot survive in our naturalistic-scientific system. Moral responsibility was a comfortable fit among gods and miracles and mysteries, but the deeper scientific understanding of human behavior and the causes shaping human character leaves no room for moral responsibility. The second claim is that when we look carefully at the moral responsibility system and at what would actually remain when that system is abolished, it is clear that what we really want—natural nonmiraculous human free will, moral judgments, warm and meaningful personal relationships, creative abilities, and the opportunity to make our own decisions and exercise effective viii Preface control—can survive and flourish without moral responsibility, and that what is lost—“just deserts,” blame and punishment, righteous retribution, special reward—we are better off without. Finally, there is the question of whether it is actually possible to reject the moral responsibility system and replace it with something else. Obviously, that will not be easy on either a personal or societal level, but the final claim of the book is that it is socially and psychologically possible and that we are already making progress toward that goal. In short, the total abolition of moral responsibility is both desirable and possible. Acknowledgments In writing this book, I have been remarkably fortunate in the kind and generous support of my family, my friends, and my colleagues, and I have been very lucky to live in an era when so many remarkable philosophers and psychologists are making such insightful contributions to the questions of free will and moral responsibility. George Graham has marked my path through the psychological literature , often alerting me to important psychological studies that I would otherwise have missed. His work on abnormal psychology and its philosophical implications is a striking example of what can be accomplished by scientifically knowledgeable contemporary philosophers. My good friend Richard Double, through his published work and our conversations, has long been my guide through the maze of issues surrounding free will and moral responsibility. The remarkable clarity of his views and his ability to map all of the connections and intersections of these tangled questions have been invaluable. Twenty-five years ago I had an opportunity to write a review of Robert Kane’s early book, Free Will and Values (1985). Before starting to read the book in preparation for writing the review, I was prepared to scoff: just another in a long line of failed libertarian fantasies, I assumed. Reading only a few pages put a quick end to my scoffing; and though I did not stay to pray, it was soon clear that Bob had developed a libertarian account that was something entirely new: rigorous, never straying anywhere close to miracles or mysteries, carefully argued, scientifically informed. Though we have never been able to reach agreement on the basic issues—Robert Kane remains a resourceful defender of the moral responsibility system that this Preface ix book attacks—his work, and a number of very enlightening conversations with him, have deepened my understanding of all the issues surrounding free will and moral responsibility (though obviously not quite to the depth that Bob would like) and have been a major stimulus to my musings on the subject. In recent visits to Tallahassee, I have had the pleasure...