Against Moral Responsibility

Chapter 13. Does Moral Responsibility Promote Respect?

13 In addition to the arguments discussed in the previous two chapters, there are other arguments that stem from the systemic assumption of moral responsibility. The elitism argument is also based on the assumption—made within the moral responsibility system—that anyone not held morally responsible must be categorized as profoundly flawed and thus excused. The most impressive version of the elitism argument is offered by the legal theorist and philosopher Michael Moore, as part of his argument against the moral legitimacy of feeling sympathy for those who commit criminal acts. According to Moore, those who feel sympathy for the disadvantaged criminal are motivated by an elitist view that the criminal is not worthy of being held to the same moral standards we set for ourselves: In the case of those feelings of sympathy on which the causal theorist relies, one aspect of their psychology should make us hesitate to honour them as sources of moral insight. There is an elitism and a condescension often (and perhaps invariably ) connected with such feelings. To stand back and to refuse to judge because one understands the causes of criminal behavior is to elevate one’s self over the unhappy deviant. The elevation of self takes place because these causal theorists typically maintain high moral standards for themselves, yet refuse to judge others by those same standards. This discrimination betokens a refusal to acknowledge the equal moral dignity of others. It betokens a sense about one’s self—as the seat of subjective will and responsibility—that one refuses to acknowledge in others. (1997, 545–546) Moore makes the same argument in an earlier chapter, using the example of Richard Herrin, a Latino student at Yale, who grew up in the barrios of Los Angeles and who murdered his wealthy girlfriend (a fellow Yale student) when she wished to end their romance. Moore offers an impassioned criticism of those who would deny that Herrin deserves severe retributive punishment: Does Moral Responsibility Promote Respect? 240 Chapter 13 We are probably not persons who grew up in the barrio of East Los Angeles, or who found Yale an alien and disconcerting culture. In any case, we certainly have never been subject to the exact same stresses and motivations as Richard Herrin. Therefore, it may be tempting to withhold from Richard the benefit each of us gives himself or herself: the benefit of being the subjective seat of a will that, although caused, is nonetheless capable of both choice and responsibility. Such discrimination is a temptation to be resisted, because it is no virtue. It is elitist and condescending toward others not to grant them the same responsibility and desert you grant to yourself. Admittedly, there are excuses the benefit of which others as well as you may avail themselves. Yet that is not the distinction invoked here. Herrin had no excuses the rest of us could not come up with in terms of various causes for our choices. To refuse to grant him the same responsibility and desert as you would grant yourself is thus an instance of what Sartre would call bad faith, the treating of a free, subjective will as an object. It is a refusal to admit that the rest of humanity shares with us that which makes us most distinctively human, our capacity to will and reason—and thus to be and do evil. Far from evincing fellowfeeling and the allowing of others to participate in our moral life, it excludes them as less than persons. Rather than succumbing to this elitism masquerading as egalitarianism, we should ask ourselves what Herrin deserves by asking what we would deserve had we done such an act. In answering this question we should listen to our guilt feelings. (1997, 148–149) The crux of Moore’s argument is well-known: wrongdoers have a right to be punished because subjecting them to deserved punishment recognizes them as members of the human moral community and excusing them from punishment excludes and demeans them. C. S. Lewis offers a clear statement of this view: To be “cured” against one’s will and cured of states which we may not regard as disease is to be put on a level with those who have not yet reached the age of reason or those who never will; to be classed with infants, imbeciles, and domestic animals. But to be punished, however severely, because we have deserved it, because we “ought to have known better,” is to...