Action, Ethics, and Responsibility

3. Killing John to Save Mary: A Defense of the Moral Distinction between Killing and Letting Die

3 1 Introduction This essay considers Michael Tooley’s argument that initiating a causal process is morally equivalent to refraining from interfering in that process. Tooley develops the Moral Symmetry Principle in order to show the moral irrelevance of whether a person causes, or merely allows, some outcome to occur. Tooley argues that the Moral Symmetry Principle is not vulnerable to the objection that it equates actions that are morally distinct. By distinguishing between preventative actions that interfere with another agent’s action from preventative actions that do not, we can resist the inference that I am just as responsible for stopping you from initiating some causal process as I am for not initiating that process myself. I argue that Tooley cannot offer any plausible ground for this allegedly significant notion of interfering in the actions of others such that it has sufficient force to overturn the objection of equating actions that are morally distinct. When it comes to preventing the initiating of causal process that will eventuate in serious harm, that one must interfere in another person’s actions is not a morally salient feature. Even if Tooley were able to offer some rationale for this principle of noninterference, its inclusion substantially restricts the number of cases to which his Moral Symmetry Principle applies. It thus fails to serve any useful purpose as a principle of morality. In addition to his more technical objection to the distinction between killing and letting die, Tooley advances a separate line of argument to undermine the idea that it matters, morally, whether we kill a person or let him die. Our conviction about the moral significance of this distinction is said by Tooley to be the result of distortion of our moral sense by the “external variables” that surround instances of killing, compared to those that typically surround instances of letting die. Killing John to Save Mary: A Defense of the Moral Distinction between Killing and Letting Die Helen Frowe 48 H. Frowe I suggest that one of the most effective ways to support the relevance of the killing/letting die distinction in these “neutral” cases is by considering what each party can permissibly do in self-defense. Tooley’s position, properly spelled out, would permit the use of lethal force against a bystander in order to induce that bystander to save one’s life, even at the cost of another innocent person’s life. This gives us further reason to reject the Moral Symmetry Principle. 2 Causing versus Failing to Interfere The Moral Symmetry Principle Michael Tooley argues that it makes no moral difference whether one initiates a causal process leading to an event E, or one merely fails to interfere in that same process to prevent E occurring. This, he claims, shows the absence of any morally significant distinction between killing and letting die. Tooley calls this the “Moral Symmetry Principle”: Let C be a causal process that normally leads to an outcome E. Let A be an action that initiates process C, and B be an action that stops process C before outcome E occurs. Assume further that actions A and B do not have any other morally signi ficant consequences, and that E is the only part or outcome of C which is morally significant in itself. Then there is no moral difference between performing action A, and intentionally refraining from performing action B, assuming identical motivation in the two cases. (Tooley 1994, 104) So, we have action A, which leads to outcome E. Doing A will cause E. The performance of action B will prevent E occurring. Intentionally not doing B will count as letting E occur. Tooley illustrates the Moral Symmetry Principle using Poisoned Whiskey. Poisoned Whiskey: Two brothers decide (independently of each other) to kill their wealthy father. The first brother poisons his father’s whiskey. The second brother catches the first in the act. The second brother had been planning to poison the whiskey himself. Now he merely fails to warn his father that the whiskey has been poisoned, and also refrains from giving him an antidote to the poison. Tooley claims “that the actions are morally equivalent, since . . . the moral symmetry principle . . . is sound” (Tooley 1994, 104). So, we have a comparison between intentionally initiating a causal process leading to the father’s death and intentionally letting the father’s death occur. In the context of Poisoned Whiskey, Tooley’s analysis seems fairly compelling. It is hard to pick...