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17 The Causal Theory of Action and the Still Puzzling Knobe Effect Thomas Nadelhoffer One can test attempted philosophical analyses of intentional action partly by ascertaining whether what these analyses entail about particular actions is in line with what the majority of non-specialists would say about these actions. . . . [I]f there is a widely shared concept of intentional action, such judgments provide evidence about what the concept is, and a philosophical analysis of intentional action that is wholly unconstrained by that concept runs the risk of having nothing more than a philosophical fiction as its subject matter. —Alfred Mele (2001, 27) 1 Introduction It is a common assumption among philosophers that whether or not something counts as an intentional action depends on what was going on “in the head” of the agent at the time it was performed. On this view, intentional actions are events that are caused by a combination of antecedent conative and cognitive mental states such as wishes, desires, beliefs, reasons, decisions, and intentions.1 And although the philosophers who adopt this kind of causal theory of action may admittedly disagree when it comes to the precise nature of the relationship between various mental states and human agency—for example, whether intentions can simply be reduced to pairs of beliefs and desires or whether intentions to x are necessary for intentionally x-ing—the orthodox view is that the proper etiological explanation of intentional action will be couched exclusively in mentalistic terms. As intuitive as this view may initially appear, however, there is gathering evidence that folk ascriptions of intentional action are sometimes driven not only by judgments concerning the mental states of the agents in question but also by the moral valence of the outcome of the action. These findings—which are collectively referred to as the “Knobe effect” (Nichols 278 T. Nadelhoffer and Ulatowski 2007, 348)—have led some philosophers to conclude that the concept of intentional action is inherently evaluative (Knobe 2003a,b). To the extent that this is the case, it potentially poses problems for the causal theory of action—at least if this theory is supposed to adequately capture the folk concept of intentionality.2 After all, if an action can be intentional so long as its consequences are sufficiently bad even if the agent who brought it about neither desired, wanted, intended, nor tried to do so, the project of explaining intentionality solely in terms of the mental states of the agent is on shaky ground. In this chapter, I am first going to briefly argue for the relevance of data on folk intuitions to the philosophical project of providing an account of intentional action. Then, I will examine some of the empirical research that has been done on this front—paying particular attention to Steve Guglielmo and Bertram Malle’s recent attempts to resolve some of the puzzles that have arisen in light of Joshua Knobe’s findings (Guglielmo and Malle n.d.a, n.d.b). More specifically, I will try to show that Guglielmo and Malle have yet to establish that the so-called Knobe effect is merely an artifact of an impoverished experimental design. In making my case, I will present the results of two new studies that suggest that even though Guglielmo and Malle have done much to advance our understanding of the folk concept of intentional action, they have yet to fully explain away Knobe’s puzzling data. At the end of the day, I will argue not only that philosophers of action need to pay close attention to the research on folk intuitions, but that this research potentially puts pressure on the common assumption that whether an action is intentional depends entirely on the mental states of the agent. That being said, it is admittedly too early in the day to determine the full extent of the threat. Plumbing these depths would require more data than we currently have at hand. As such, my primary goal in this chapter is merely to survey a small piece of the empirical terrain, present the results of two new studies, and consider some of the potential implications for the philosophy of action. Resolving all of the thorny underlying issues is an arduous task for another day that will require philosophers and psychologists to continue to work together on the important project of understanding the fundamental nature of human agency. 2 Folk Concepts and the Philosophy of Action Oliver Wendell Holmes once famously remarked that “even a...

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