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3 Gathering Forces In December 1917, in spite of tension between hard-line Bolshevik policies and Left SR ideals reflected in conflict over repression of the Kadets and the structural relationship between the Sovnarkom and the CEC, the Left SRs agreed to accept posts in the Sovnarkom. Contrary to accepted wisdom, directly connected to this development was the founding of one of the pillars of early Soviet repression, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution, Speculation, and Sabotage (VCheka). According to traditional interpretations of the creation of the VCheka, by the first week of December 1917 the MRC, recognizing that its mission of seizing and consolidating Soviet power in Petrograd had been fulfilled, voluntarily liquidated itself. This step was implemented at a meeting of the Sovnarkom on 5 December which established a group to coordinate dissolution of the MRC within seven days. The next day, so these interpretations go, a nationwide civil servants strike prompted Lenin to propose to the Sovnarkom that Felix Dzerzhinskii form a special commission to explore means for fighting such political sabotage by forceful revolutionary measures. The great urgency attached to this task was reflected in the fact that at the Sovnarkom ’s meeting on 7 December, when it became known that Dzerzhinskii ’s commission was still in session, the Sovnarkom agreed not to disperse until it had finished its work.That evening, Dzerzhinskii called for the creation of a powerful temporary agency attached to the Sovnarkom to combat counterrevolution and sabotage. His idea was accepted on the spot and the VCheka was born.1 Documents from Soviet archives that shed light on the development of the MRC during the last weeks of its existence, and on its relationship to the Sovnarkom during this time, prompted me to question this interpretation . In the aftermath of the October days, the MRC had filled the void created by work stoppages in government agencies and assumed responsibility for providing basic municipal services and coordinating the security and Gathering Forces / 81 defense of the revolution in Petrograd. Especially between 4 and 17 November , when, following Rykov’s resignation, the position of people’s commissar for internal affairs was vacant, the MRC accumulated vast powers to fight counterrevolution, sabotage, and speculation. In mid November, as well, the merger of the All-Russian Executive Committee of Peasants’ Soviets with the All-Russian Executive Committee of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Soviets was successfully completed, and negotiations over a Bolshevik–Left SR coalition in the Sovnarkom began.2 It remained uncertain for the next two weeks which of the left socialist parties, the Bolsheviks or Left SRs, would end up in control of the combined CEC. During that interval the Left SRs had particularly great leverage vis-à-vis the Bolsheviks . Among other things, the Bolsheviks now accepted a Left SR demand for parity in the MRC, an unappealing concession for Bolshevik leaders .3 The Left SRs, immediately after the October days, had fiercely attacked the MRC’s violence against political opponents and the curtailment of civil rights. Now, Left SR equality in the MRC threatened to obstruct the Bolsheviks ’ freedom of action in repressing political enemies. At a meeting of the Sovnarkom, on 15 November, sentiment for abolishing the MRC was voiced. Sverdlov, chair of the CEC, vigorously opposed such a step. Instead, he proposed that the MRC’s responsibilities be narrowed significantly and that funds for combating counterrevolution and other funds not subject to accounting should be transferred to the MRC from the Commissariat for Internal Affairs. To preclude Left SR equality in the MRC from interfering with repression of political enemies, he also urged that the MRC’s Military Commission, which the Bolsheviks would try to retain under their control , have the right to make independent arrests without interference from the full MRC.4 The record of the 15 November Sovnarkom meeting does not indicate any action on these recommendations. However, at a meeting of the MRC on 21 November, the Bolshevik leadership in the MRC initiated steps to form a wholly new agency to fight counterrevolution from which Left SRs would be excluded. This step was negated the next day, when the Left SRs forced the Bolsheviks to include them.5 Recognizing that the MRC had become a pawn in negotiations over the formation of a Bolshevik–Left SR coalition government, the Bolshevik MRC leadership postponed reorganizing it.6 Although intense Left SR criticism of Bolshevik “terror” continued unabated throughout these weeks, and although it was now clear that the Left...

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