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c h a p t e r e l e v e n the 27th infantry division on southern saipan The 27th Infantry Division was a New York National Guard unit until it was federalized in the fall of 1940. From that moment on, membership in the division diversified as draftees from other states were added to bring it to full strength. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the division was shipped to Hawaii to serve as a defense force on the outer islands. Originally composed of four regiments, the division was “triangularized” in 1942, divided into the 105th, 106th, and 165th Regiments. In 1943 the 165th Regiment led the assault on Makin in the Gilberts, and the next year two battalions of the 106th participated in the taking of Eniwetok in the Marshalls. As a result, only the 105th Regiment was mostly without battle experience at the time of the invasion of Saipan.1 After November 1942, Major General Ralph Smith served as commander of the division. The 27th Division left Hawaii early on 1 June 1944 and spent one week sailing to Kwajalein before the final debarkation for Saipan. As the floating reserve, the 27th faced a unique situation. While the marine divisions knew exactly what their mission would be, the army could find itself fighting on Saipan, Tinian, or Guam, depending on how each situation unfolded. As a result, “staff officers had to provide for a total of nineteen different operational plans.”2 Some sources claim that there were as many as twenty-two plans.3 Not surprisingly, individual soldiers were confused by all of the contingencies they were forced to study. In the end, none of the tactical designs fit the actual deployment of the division. 142 d-day in the pacific Although American officers had discussed the problem of army versus marine tactics in advance, these issues had not been resolved before the ships left for the Marianas.4 Holland Smith had expected a rapid victory that would not include the army, but when that quick conquest did not materialize the reserve forces had to be committed to the battle. Smith assumed that army officers would understand and execute his orders as if they were Marine Corps officers. When receiving orders from Smith, however, army officers implemented them in accordance with army training and principles. Smith never worked to resolve these differences. He was not pleased with the results, but he never understood his own role in the dispute. As late as noon on 16 June, neither Smith nor naval command had determined whether the 27th would be deployed, but early in the afternoon the situation changed rapidly. The rushed decision to commit the 27th Division to Saipan was the result of two factors. First, while the marines fought valiantly on D-Day, they suffered heavy casualties and had not achieved their objectives for the first day. Committing the reserves to compensate for lost manpower was a logical action. Second, American submarines had sighted the Japanese fleet moving from the Philippines toward Saipan, and Admiral Spruance realized that a major sea battle was imminent. As a result, he felt that the troop transports holding the army regiments were vulnerable and had to unload their soldiers. On orders from navy officers, Ralph Smith sailed to the command ship, the Cambria, for a planning meeting. Unfortunately, confusing and incomplete communications between navy, marine, and army officers created a difficult situation. According to one of Ralph Smith’s officers, Holland Smith was unprepared for the arrival of the army commanders and barked at the army leadership: “What the hell are you doing here?”5 Despite this rude welcome, Ralph Smith met with Rear Admiral Harry Hill, second in command under Turner, and with marine Graves Erskine, Holland Smith’s chief of staff. They ordered the 27th Division artillery to move onto the island immediately to support the marines, with that action to be followed quickly by the landing of the 165th Regiment and then the 105th. Both regiments were ordered to assist the 4th Marine Division. For the moment the 106th Regiment would remain on ship as a possible reserve for the invasion of Guam. Reflecting the confusion prevalent at this moment, the order to land the 27th Division, minus the 106th Regiment, was sent to Ralph Smith’s command ship, the Fremont, before Smith had returned to her. In addition, these broad instructions did not clarify or delineate the precise mission of the 27th. Nevertheless, Brigadier Gen...

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