Handbook of Semiotics

Icon and Iconicity

Icon and Iconicity Iconic signs, according to the classical definitions of Peirce and Morris, have a sign vehicle which is similar to their denotatum, but the validity of this criterion of similarity has frequently been questioned. Icons not only are signs of visual communication, but exist in almost any area of the semiotic field, including language (see also Metaphor, and Arbitrariness and Motivation). Literature on iconicity can be found in the bibliography by Huggins &. Entwistle (1974), articles by Eco (1972b; 1976: 191-217), Volli (1972b), Krampen (1973), and Sebeok (1979: 107-127), and especially the collected papers in Bouissac et al., eds. (1986). For iconicity in language, literature (see the special issue of Word & Image 2.3 [1986]), and the arts, see the special issues of Communications 29 (1978), Degres 15 (1978), and Hasenmueller (1981), Steiner, ed. (1981a), and Baron (1984). 1. Peirce's Definition of the Icon Peirce gave various definitions of the icon which focus on different criteria valid for a large class of semiotic phenomena (cf. Greenlee 1973: 70-84, Elling 1978, Scherer 1984: 67-74, Pharies 1985: 34-39, Ransdell 1986). One of his main criteria is based on his semiotic category of firstness. Another is the criterion of similarity between the sign vehicle and its object. From his triadic system of semiotics, Peirce derived a triple subclassification of the icon. 1.1 Immediacy of the Icon Peirce's icon is a sign which signifies by its own quality, in contrast to the index, which depends on its object, and the symbol, which depends on conventions between interpreters. 1.1.1 FIRSTNESS OF THE ICON In Peirce'5 universal categorial system, the icon belongs to the category of firstness, in contrast to the index and symbol, which belong to secondness and thirdness. Firstness is the mode of being which represents "the absolute present [ . . . ], something which is what it is without reference to anything else" (§ 2.85). The icon participates in firstness because it is "a Sign whose significant virtue is due simply to its Quality" (§ 2.92), or: "An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to be a representamen" (§ 2.276). 1.1.2 THE PURE ICON However, since every genuine sign always participates in secondness (qua object) and thirdness (qua interpretant), a pure icon (cf. § 2.92) 1. PEIRCE'S DEFINITION OF THE ICON • 121 or iconic qualisign (see Peirce 3.1) is only a hypothetical possibility. It cannot really exist, for: "A sign by Firstness is an image of its object and [ ... ] can only be an idea. For it must produce an Interpretant idea [ ... ]. But most strictly speaking, even an idea, except in the case of a possibility, or Firstness, cannot be an Icon. A possibility alone is an Icon purely by virtue of its quality; and its object can only be a Firstness" (§ 2.276). A pure icon would be a noncommunicative sign, since "a pure icon is independent of any purpose. It serves as a sign solely and simply by exhibiting the quality it serves to signify" (Peirce 1976: vol. 4, p. 242). Pure icons therefore represent only a hypothetical borderline case of semiosis. Peirce envisioned such a case under the following circumstances : "In contemplating a painting, there is a moment when we lose the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream-not any particular existence, and yet not general. At that moment we are contemplating an icon" (§ 3.362). Since pure icons are signs by themselves and do not depend on an object, "a pure icon can convey no positive or factual information; for it affords no assurance that there is any such thing in nature" (§ 4.447). Thus, no actual sign is a pure icon (c( Ayer 1968: 150). Apure icon "can only be a fragment of a completer sign" (Peirce 1973: § 4.422). To characterize real and material iconic representations in contrast to pure icons (iconic qualisigns ), Peirce introduced the term hypoicon (§ 2.276). A hypoicon is either an iconic sinsign or an iconic legisign (see Peirce 3.4). 1.1.3 SEMIOTIC DEGENERACY OF THE PURE ICON The pure icon is a semiotic paradox. As a sign it should participate in a semiotic triad; as a pure icon it participates only in firstness. Peirce (§§ 2.91-92, 3.360-62...