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12 chapter two Establishing Contact Huang-Stuart Talks, 1949 The year 1949 proved pivotal in changing the dynamics of postwar international relations. In 1949, the People’s Republic of China replaced the Republic of China, after winning a nationwide victory in the civil war and driving the Nationalist government to Taiwan. The collapse of the Nationalist cause shocked the American public, which had idealized “free China” as a democratic ally and valiant protégé. Now, a Communist China had inevitably extended the Cold War to East Asia. Throughout 1949, policymakers in Washington had to weigh the fear of Communism, particularly the Soviet control of China, against the practical necessity of dealing with the new rulers of China. For two months in the middle of 1949, American of¤cials saw a seeming opportunity to negotiate with the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party over issues related to the uncertain future of U.S.-China relations. In May and June, Ambassador John L. Stuart met and held a series of talks in Nanjing with Huang Hua, a high-level CCP foreign affairs of¤cial. The effort soon proved futile, due in part to the divergence of interests and ideological differences. How did the Stuart-Huang talks become possible? What did the U.S. expect to gain from the talks? What did the CCP expect to achieve from such contact with the United States? How did American of¤cials view the Chinese Communists , and vice versa? What were the major differences that invalidated these contacts? How did this failed contact between the two affect the subsequent CCP-U.S. relations? establishing contact 13 I The unfolding Cold War de¤ned how the initial post–civil war contact between the U.S. and the CCP was to play out. The priority of policymakers in Washington, confronted with what they saw as the expanding Soviet threat, was to preserve as much of Europe from Communist control as possible. That meant, ¤rst and foremost, a massive U.S. effort to rebuild the shattered European economy. In 1948, the United States began to send large-scale aid to Europe under the Marshall Plan. American of¤cials also discussed seriously with the Europeans a program for mutual security. However, U.S. resources were “too limited to think in terms of mounting a similar effort” on behalf of Nationalist China.1 In the last months of 1948, the CCP’s growing military victories forced the U.S. and its allies to prepare for a Communist regime in China. The fear that China might come to be dominated by a hostile foreign power increased. The Truman administration was in search of a feasible China policy, but policymakers in Washington were uncertain of what direction CCP policy toward the United States would be heading. It is interesting to note that when it came to what the U.S. could realistically do, available and feasible options were limited. Secretary of State George C. Marshall and his advisers were convinced that Communist control of China would have adverse effects on American interests there and on the world balance of power. Notwithstanding this view, Marshall was determined to avoid a commitment to provide Jiang Jieshi’s Nationalist government with the means to victory because they feared the burden on the United States would be too large and too long, “of uncertain magnitude and inde¤nite duration.”2 Marshall was acutely aware of the burgeoning demand for U.S. resources in Western Europe and the possible need to send U.S. troops to Greece, Italy, or Palestine. Direct intervention in China on Jiang’s behalf was ruled out on the ground that the weakness of Jiang’s regime precluded success. George Kennan, director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, had similar views. Kennan had a low estimate of China’s importance in the Cold War. In February 1948, he counseled ending American commitments to Jiang, thereby boosting Philippine and Japanese security by using troops and other resources that had been committed to Nationalist China.3 The Marshall-Kennan “consensus” on China seems to have dominated a National Security Council meeting in March 1948 when America’s China policy was discussed. The NSC believed that the Soviet objective in Asia was to establish in¶uence over China ¤rst, then over Southeast Asia, and ¤nally over the whole Asia-Paci¤c area. Council members pointed out that for the Soviets, China was militarily signi¤cant “because of its (a) geographical position and (b) tremendous man...

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