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c h a p t e r t w o Naval Operations upon the Outbreak of World War I and the Genesis of the Plan for a Raid into Heligoland Bight s the naval arms race augmented the navies of both Britain and Germany, strategies crystallized for employing the improved ¶eets in a war between the two nations. While the naval administrations of both countries struggled with how best to pursue operations at sea, events in Europe progressively brought the two powers closer to war. By 1914, Europe was polarized into two different alliance systems, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion. This was partially the result of the alliances themselves. The Triple Alliance members, Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Italy, were arrayed against the Triple Entente, Great Britain, France, and Russia. Any con¶ict in foreign affairs that one member of an alliance might have with a member of the opposite camp invariably involved all members of the respective alliances. As a result, a war between any two members of the respective sides could ultimately result in a war involving all of Europe. This situation was exacerbated by the naval arms race between Britain and Germany. Other sources of friction included an arms race in land forces, imperial competition between the great powers of Europe, and the forces of nationalism. This latter problem, being de¤ned loosely in this case as a general desire by people of a similar cultural background to found their own ethnic state, led to the 28 July 1914 assassination of heir to the Austro- 28 genesis of the plan for a raid into heligoland bight Hungarian throne Franz Ferdinand by a nationalist Serb society known as the “Black Hand.” While the assassination in itself was not enough to cause a European con¶ict, the actions of the great powers ultimately produced World War I. Both the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Germany wished to use the assassination to further their own ends in the region of the Balkans. The Austro-Hungarian Empire recognized the event as an opportunity to crush Slavic nationalism, which threatened the integrity of the empire, through a war with Serbia. Germany supported this action in part to retain the support of their primary European ally, but also in the hope of stabilizing the Balkans with the object of establishing ¤rm lines of communication to Turkey. By this time, a Berlin to Baghdad railway constructed for the sake of expanding trade was well on its way to completion and ran through the Balkans.1 The Germans, as a result, issued the famous “blank cheque,” a pledge of support, for the Austro-Hungarian Empire to pursue its goal. Both German and Austro-Hungarian politicians viewed this as a limited war that would be concluded within a month, but the con¶ict involved all of the major powers. Two days after Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28 July 1914, Russia ordered a general mobilization of its military forces. The Russians, who both viewed themselves as the defenders of Slavs and also had ambitions in the Balkans, hoped to force Austria-Hungary to back down. Germany then demanded that Russia cease its mobilization effort. This action was necessary to the Germans as their war plan for a continental war, the Schlieffen Plan, was designed to counter a two-front war versus France and Russia. It relied on a crushing attack against France in order to quickly defeat the country and then a strike against Russia while it was still mobilizing its forces. If Russia mobilized, it would make such a plan impossible to carry out in the event of a European war. As a result of Russian inaction, on 1 August 1914, Germany declared war on Russia. Two days later, a declaration of war was issued to France. By this time, Germany and Austria-Hungary were at war with Russia and France. This situation, however, did not make war inevitable between Great Britain and Germany. The British vacillated over their decision, and indeed on 26 July King George V of England had expressed his hope that, as Britain had no direct grievance with either Germany or Austria-Hungary, his country would remain neutral.2 The government of Herbert Asquith largely shared the desire for neutrality in the war. Such was the stance of the British government that the kaiser, his government, and in large part his naval of¤cials believed that Britain would keep out of...

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