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12. “Like a Meatchopper on Roundsteak”
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188 chapter twelve “Like a Meatchopper on Roundsteak” Louis Johnson’s accomplishments in gaining control over all of the armed services and making uni¤cation work were the successes as secretary of defense that he would have most liked to have been remembered for. Unfortunately, he is most identi¤ed with a scorched-earth economy program that ended up weakening the military strength of the United States. That Johnson’s successes in uni¤cation should go largely unnoticed while his cost-cutting receives the lion’s share of attention is due primarily to the fact that the Korean War began ¤fteen months into his tenure as secretary. When that con¶ict erupted in the summer of 1950, the American people, Congress, and the president focused on who to blame for the predicament the country found itself in. The understrength, poorly equipped army became the target of a storm of criticism. As usual, the nation began searching for someone to condemn for the military’s failures. It did not take long for a scapegoat to be found, and Secretary Johnson was put on the sacri¤cial altar. He was put there by the president, and politicians and the public generally applauded the offering. What is richly ironic about the fate that Johnson was to suffer is that the economy measures he so successfully instituted in the armed services were done at the insistence and encouragement of President Truman and with widespread support from Congress, the public, and the press. One well-known observer of the Defense Department summed it up best when he wrote, “Economy in Defense Department spending was blamed then for permitting that surprise attack [on Korea], and Johnson, the image of military frugality, became a scapegoat, actually for having carried out Truman’s policy so well.”1 “like a meatchopper on roundsteak” 189 Budget Imperatives From the day Johnson took over the Defense Department, he made it clear that economy would be the hallmark of hisadministration. In hisvery ¤rst statement to the press he signaled his intention to provide the nation with “the maximum of strength within the limits of economy,” but what those limits would be he was not yet willing to say.2 In the weeks that followed, he made it clear that he supported the president’s austere $14.2 billion military budget for the upcoming¤scal year, and in the year that followed he proved to be more committed to economy than anyone had expected. Johnson’s reasons for championing the cause of defense austerity were motivated by sincere economic concerns, loyalty to President Truman, his instinct for political survival, and, probably, by his presidential ambitions. His commitment to lean defense budgets stemmed in large part from a conviction that excessive defense spending would bankrupt the U.S. government, thereby leading to its ultimate destruction. To him, it was not the military threat facing the nation that presented the biggest challenge of the Cold War, it was the danger of economic ruin. If extravagant defense spending was not curbed, he warned members of Congress, the result would be exactly “what the Russians want: wreck the economy of America.”3 Later he elaborated on that idea by remarking that the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, “doesn’t look to a clash of arms, [but] he expects America to spend itself into bankruptcy.”4 Such beliefs led him to conclude that if severe limitations were not imposed on American defense spending it would surely lead to the country’s economic ruin, after which the Soviet Union would take over America. In holding such economic views, Johnson was in company with a large number of Americans, including many in Congress, who believed “that the economy was already at the limit, if not over it, of what it could spend on defense.”5 Many lawmakers maintained that one of the major reasons for passing the National Security Act of 1947 was the expectation that it would bring about substantial savings in defense expenditures. Johnson’s desire to cut back on defense outlays was by no means unique, but he was in a better position than most people in Washington to do something about it. While economic motives were essential to Johnson’s economy program, loyalty and political considerations were not far behind. Johnson’s cabinet job could be retained only as long as he remained loyal to and pleased the Boss. If he could continue to do that, the position he had so long coveted would belong to him...