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168 chapter eleven Revolt of the Admirals In stepping into the secretary of defense position in early 1949, Louis Johnson acknowledged, as did his friends and enemies, that he was assuming what was clearly, next to the presidency itself, the most dif¤cult job in Washington .1 The scope and complexity of the tasks facing him were beyond the comprehension of most experienced administrators. Both at the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill there were many who were convinced that no single executive could handle such a large and diverse organization. However, Johnson was convinced that he could do the job and do it as it should be done. From the outset, the principal problem Johnson faced centered on uni¤cation of the armed forces. Under the National Security Act of 1947, the nation was attempting for the ¤rst time to unify its land, naval, and air forces. While some progress had been made under Secretary Forrestal, a great deal remained to be done. The multitude of problems stemming from uni¤cation would have been challenging in and of themselves, but they were exacerbated by the fact that the president was demanding deep cuts in defense spending. Viewed separately , uni¤cation and economization were extremely explosive issues. The combination made the political-military situation in the nation’s capital about as stable as nitroglycerin. Secretary Johnson was fully committed to both challenges. Johnson understood that opposition would come not only from outside the military—from Congress, the public, and the press—but even more so from within the military establishment. What he did not realize was that his initial efforts would lead to the most ¶agrant challenge ever hurled by top-ranking American military men at the civilian leadership of the United States. That rebellion, by an elite group revolt of the admirals 169 of battle-hardened admirals who had devoted their lives to serving their country , was known as the “revolt of the admirals.” Seeds of Discontent The 1949 revolt was a ¶are-up of an old feud between the advocates of land-based airpower and those of sea-based airpower. Throughout the years of this con¶ict, both sides were convinced that their particular arm provided the soundest platform on which to build the nation’s defense. In the 1920s, the dispute was between General Billy Mitchell and the admirals, while in the 1930s the two groups battled for the few dollars the Depression-racked nation could provide. While it would seem that the unity of purpose during the war years of the 1940s might have worked to reduce interservice rivalry, in fact the war actually increased tensions as the navy, army, and army air corps continually bickered over missions, roles, and responsibilities. These disputes gave rise to a feeling in Washington that uni¤cation of all services under one cabinet department would be desirable, but there also was a consensus that any drastic change in the command setup would have to await the conclusion of the war.2 That uni¤cation would not fade away in the postwar period became certain on April 12, 1945, when President Roosevelt died and was succeeded by Harry Truman. Although the new chief executive did not hold rigid views on many topics, he was ¤rmly resolved from the outset of his presidency to achieve uni-¤cation of all of the armed services. Just one week after assuming of¤ce he directed his service secretaries to prepare a proposal for a single department of defense.3 With this impetus from the top, both services moved to ¤nalize their respective plans. The army, which accepted as a foregone conclusion that the air corps would emerge as a separate entity, favored a true merger of the armed forces with control exercised by a single cabinet secretary. Secretary of War Robert Patterson spoke out strongly for the plan, as did army generals Dwight Eisenhower, George Marshall, Hap Arnold, and Douglas MacArthur. The navy, on the other hand, accepted only very reluctantly the idea of a separate air force and vigorously opposed a merger with the army, opting instead for a plan to “coordinate” the separate services. Backed by a study headed by his longtime friend Ferdinand Eberstadt, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal adamantly opposed the army plan. He was especially critical because he felt that administering a department which encompassed both the army and navy was “beyond the capacity of any one man.” Similar statements, although in most cases much stronger, were made by such...

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