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157 eight Kant and Kierkegaard on the Need for a Historical Faith An Imaginary Dialogue Ronald M. Green January 1, 2027. Immanuel Kant and Søren Kierkegaard unexpectedly find themselves sharing a corner in the Delta Medallion Club at Denver Airport. Snow has delayed their flights for several hours. The two great scholars of philosophy and religion are familiar with one another’s writings. Thanks to the work of Gill, Glenn, Mehl, Perkins, Green, and others in the last quarter of the twentieth century, it is now well known that Kierkegaard constructed much of his thinking on the foundation of Kant’s philosophy .1 Kant’s familiarity with Kierkegaard is more recent—one aspect of the education program he has gone through in the decade since his ‘‘reanimation’’ was accomplished by means of modern genetic science and computer technology. A waiter takes their order and returns with two glasses of California Chardonnay and a bowl of Goldfish crackers. Kant: I really enjoy these little crackers, don’t you? Kierkegaard: One of the best of the modern ‘‘inventions’’! Recognizing that they have an opportunity to pursue a topic dear to them, the two thinkers quickly turn to ethics and its relationship to religion. Kierkegaard: Let me say, first of all, how pleased I am to have this chance Theological Applications for Kantian Religion 158 to express my thanks to you. As you know, during my lifetime I was unable to be as public as I would have liked about my reliance on your work. The Danish attitude toward rationalism in general and to Kantianism in particular was so negative in my day; I never joined this chorus of voices. I took a strong stand of opposition to the Hegelians who made light of your work, and I took pains to insert brief but very positive things about your philosophy and your character in my writings.2 But I admit I never credited you properly. Kant: I understand. Frankly, I’m not sure what I would have done in your place. As you know, despite my reputation for moral rigor, I made my own compromises with strict veracity. One of these was my pledge to King Friedrich to obey his edict not to publish Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. Without saying so, I interpreted this as a pledge to Friedrich just so long as he remained alive. Many have since remarked that I was a bit casuistic in my reasoning. Kierkegaard: Since you raise the subject of Religion, let me say here how much this book influenced me. During my student years it was a ray of light in the darkness. Here was the undisputed moral rationalist, the father of the modern concept of moral autonomy, affirming the ‘‘radical evil’’ in human beings and our need for divine grace to achieve moral fulfillment! Kant: It’s interesting that you should say that. I confess I was initially unhappy with my conclusions in Religion. I thought I had said all there is to say about rational religious beliefs when I wrote the Critique of Practical Reason. A moral governor of the universe, the possible continuance of our life beyond death to accomplish our perfection in moral virtue—I honestly believed these were the only religious concepts we needed to complete the moral life. Kierkegaard: What was it that changed your mind? You know many have said Religion was nothing more than your effort to pacify the orthodox, including your manservant Lampe. Kant: That’s amusing, and unfair to Lampe. He was no fool and disliked priestcraft as much as I did. In fact, Religion was really a surprising consequence of an idea already present in the second Critique. It was an idea I initially resisted, because I feared its practical implications. I yielded to it only when I became convinced of its truth and power.3 Kierkegaard: What is that idea? Kant: That in relation to morality we are radically free. In the second Critique I began to explore a basic problem in rational moral justification. We know we are bound by the moral law whose voice is commanding. We also know we are ‘‘creatures of needs’’ who are compelled to seek the satisfaction of our desires, the sum of which constitute our happiness.4 Indeed, one purpose of morality is to create the rule of law that permits all persons the ordered pursuit of their happiness. But the question is, how are we to reason...

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