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3. At the Gates of the Vatican
- Indiana University Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
3 At the Gates of the Vatican “Noncontact with the Vatican” It is indisputable that, from 1948 on, the Catholic Church refused to contemplate the establishment of formal political ties with the new state of Israel.This attitude was to change radically only decades later. Until the mid-1950s, Israel , which had strong reservations of its own on this issue for various reasons, was influenced by this uncompromising rejection and by the fierce political struggle that raged around Jerusalem. Sharett’s fifteen-minute audience with the pope during his official visit to Italy in March 1952—at which the Israeli foreign minister was forced for the first time in his life to wear “a frock coat with a white tie and black waistcoat in the middle of the day”1—was no more than a gesture to protocol. He was greatly impressed by this unusual event and interpreted the pope’s brief reference to the Christian communities in Israel as “acknowledgment of Israel as the ruler.” But, in fact, the meeting was of no political significance. It was not the product of prior political contacts and had no follow-up.2 There were, however, certain natural mutual interests that required informal contact: the Jerusalem problem and the situation of the Christian minority in Israel. Such contacts were maintained in diverse ways: visits to Rome of Israeli delegations (in 1948,1949,and 1950); indirect communication with leading Catholic figures and organizations in various countries; infrequent visits of senior Catholic churchmen to Israel (notably, McMahon’s visits in 1948, 1949, 1951, and 1953); and contacts with Catholic clerics in Israel. It was important for Israel to ascertain the pope’s motives and current policy, in particular regarding internationalization.The mutual avoidance of formal relations, particularly by the Israeli embassy in Rome,however,hindered efforts to achieve this aim. As the Israeli minister in Italy, Yishai, was advised in June 1951, We must realize that any approach to the Vatican on matters pertaining to Israel and other Jewish issues . . . could have widespread positive but also negative repercussions. We must do everything possible to avoid such meetings Bialer, Cross on the Star 6/9/05 8:43 AM Page 52 except after very meticulous consultations and planning which take into account all possible results. . . . Generally speaking, we should not take the initiative and seek meetings . . . but we should not refuse to meet when the initiative comes from the other side . . . We should not create the impression that we are eager and willing for any opportunity for contact.3 The Israeli diplomat apparently had no need of this explanation and reported to his superiors that“I will not believe theVatican even when they hint that they are ready to meet with us. They will do so when it suits their own objectives, and will be ready to do so in order to reassure us and to conceal action directed against us.”4 His replacement, Eliahu Sasson, did not agree with this qualified approach; when it seemed that he was liable to embark on diplomatic activity in order to test his own theories, the director-general ordered him “not to try to establish any contact with theVatican.”The official pretext was that“it would contravene custom for a minister accredited to the Italian government to establish relations with the Vatican,”5 but the motive was, in fact, political— unwillingness to initiate a real dialogue. Consequently, until the mid-1950s, contacts with the Holy See in Rome, which were few and far between, took place solely on the initiative of the Vatican, almost always at the behest of the papal nuncio to the Italian government.6 In 1950–51 an attempt was made to counteract the unreliability of intelligence appraisals by establishing a small unit at the legation, headed by Avraham Kidron, charged with the task of finding informal and clandestine avenues of contact with the Vatican. It was operative for only one year and—insofar as can be learned from recently opened Foreign Ministry files—was dissolved for unclear reasons.Within the Foreign Ministry itself, a single research division official was engaged, on a part-time basis, in collection and analysis of intelligence reports on this subject.Thus the policymakers in Jerusalem received only scraps of information from these units and from Israel’s diplomatic missions. No wonder, therefore, that in April 1953 Herzog complained to Eytan about“our scant knowledge of theVatican’s thinking and actions . . . on Israel.”7 However,those few significant items of...