Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11

August 19, 2003

August 19, 2003 Having been prompted by the terrorist attacks of September , , and then completed in the midst of the Security Council debate on Iraq, this book goes to press only a few days after the tragic bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad on August , . The perils of unilateralism and multilateralism have been starkly presented in the events following the declared “end” of the War in Iraq on May , . The aftermath of this war has demonstrated that while U.S. power may be an order of magnitude greater than that of any other state at present, that power has limits. It also demonstrates that these concepts are not as mutually exclusive as they may seem. Global security problems require global solutions. It is beyond the capability of any actor, even the remaining superpower, to tackle problems by going it alone. Transnational security problems require multilateralism . In our introduction, we suggest that the events surrounding Iraq are“quite separate” from the UN’s role in dealing with terrorism. The bombing in Baghdad has effectively eliminated most of that separateness. The fact that the division of labor between the non-UN-authorized “coalition” forces and the United Nations was clear (by both UN choice and U.S. design), and that the UN’s presence was oriented toward helping the Iraqi people meant little to the forces that determined that terrorist tactics would help achieve their ends. Indeed, it may be the very constructive and humanitarian nature of the world organization’s activities that made it such a target. There is a bitter irony in this fact, but it is an irony that is precisely indicative of the inherent complexity and pernicious nature of terrorism. The Baghdad bombing presents the United Nations with an extraordinarily difficult dilemma with implications that extend well beyond its role in Iraq. A retreat behind fortified walls and a failure to confront the source of the threat is a de facto victory for terrorists. Plowing ahead without taking protective measures may result in more attacks. Either option contains within it the likelihood that the accessibility and efficacy of the world organization will be limited and, perhaps, even undermined. One of our starting points in undertaking this book was the assumption that as the institution mandated ix to deal with issues of international peace and security, the United Nations should be at the forefront of the debate on how to deal with terrorism. Whatever else we might conclude about the attack, it is now the case that the UN must be at the forefront of that debate. It remains too soon to develop firm conclusions, but it may yet be that the August th attack will be a turning point that marks a fundamental change in the UN itself. In any case, we dedicate this book to our dead and seriously injured colleagues. J.B. and T.G.W. August ,  x August 19, 2003 ...