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156 chapter seven Winston Churchill, Arthur Harris, and British Strategic Bombing It was as heroic, as self sacrificing, as Russia’s decision to adopt her policy of “scorched earth.” —J. M. Spaight, on Churchill's decision in May 1940 to undertake the bombing of Germany he area bombing approach of the British Bomber Command in World War II was, and remains, highly controversial. Culminating in the pointless bombing of Dresden in February 1945, it cost the lives of more than three hundred thousand German civilians and more than seventy thousand British airmen , while its strategic value was debatable. Winston Churchill, who as early as World War I questioned the value of mass aerial assault against urban populations , essentially gave the “go ahead” for area bombing in World War II. In a move that was unusual for him, a military leader known for taking great (and often unwanted) interest in strategic and tactical considerations of all kinds, he surrendered virtually all authority to Air Marshal Arthur Harris. While aware of the increasingly heavy toll area bombing was exacting upon Bomber Command , and of the serious questions concerning its effectiveness, Harris remained in¶exibly committed to it. In considering the problems presented by persistent adherence to area bombing doctrine, we will use two approaches. With regard to Churchill, it appears that the cognitive/affective one utilized earlier with regard to Frederick the Great can be of value. In considering Arthur Harris’s in¶exible and costly adherence to an extremely questionable doctrine, the “trial-and-error” hypothesis seems to be most effective. We have already employed the ¤rst approach. The second will be explained in due course. In the eyes of many, Great Britain led the way in determining that airpower could and would be utilized for strategic purposes. For Alexander P. De Seversky , whose eloquent and often overstated panegyrics to aerial bombardment T churchill, arthur harris, and british strategic bombing 157 contributed to an overly roseate evaluation of its potentials, everything from British bombing methods to the design of the bombers themselves pointed to an understanding of the strategic use of the airplane that had eluded both American and German military minds.1 For Brig. Gen. Dale O. Smith, Britain ’s forming of the Royal Air Force (RAF) as an independent armed service in March 1918, just before the massive German spring offensive, was “courageous ” and indicated an acceptance of Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard’s pioneering concepts regarding the strategic uses of the airplane.2 Even the commander of Germany’s ¤ghter command, Generalleutnant Adolf Galland, in many ways critical of the British approach to aerial warfare, readily conceded that it was England, not Germany, which succeeded in creating a “strategical air force,” and that it was indeed this force which “eventually crushed Germany .”3 In point of fact, there can be no argument regarding the superior quality of British bomber aviation, especially when compared to that of Nazi Germany . One also has to appreciate the forward-looking nature of British aerial doctrine since the time Trenchard’s re¶ections upon bombardment strategy¤rst began to have a serious impact upon British military thinking in general.4 Furthermore, with Winston Churchill’s assuming the post of prime minister in May 1940, Britain’s war effort was apparently to be directed by an individual possessed of a keen military mind, one open to innovation, and with a far-reaching and imaginative strategic sense. Whatever criticisms one could bring to bear against Churchill—even those of today, in an age in which imperialistic pretence must appear to be both arrogant and ludicrous—there can be no gainsaying the fact that he was an excellent war leader, far better than Hitler in the long run.5 To be sure, while serving as ¤rst lord of the Admiralty, Churchill seemed to have something of a blind spot with regard to the role of sea power vis-à-vis a powerful enemy air force. Thus, with the outbreak of a general European war in September 1939, he began to entertain truly fantastic notions about starting a naval offensive in order to break into the Baltic and, in so doing, disrupt German maritime activities. Even in the First World War, the Admiralty had considered such a move impossible. With the emergence of modern airpower, it most assuredly appeared to be chimerical.6 Also, like many of those who had been brought up in the naval tradition, Churchill, again as ¤rst lord of the Admiralty, made the mistake of...

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