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122 chapter six Beyond Conventional Historical Explanations: The British Military in World War one (with particular emphasis on douglas haig) The machine gun is a much overrated weapon, and two per battalion is more than sufficient. —Gen. Sir Douglas Haig eon Festinger, in his work A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, has declared that “dissonance” results when an individual’s choice of action or belief is challenged by new situations and information. In such a case, the individual attempts to preserve consistency—or “consonance,” as he calls it—by “actively avoid[ing] situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance .”1 In any choice between alternative courses of action there are “cognitive elements” corresponding to favorable aspects of the rejected choice and elements corresponding to the unfavorable ones of the selected choice. Once a choice has been made, dissonance “can be materially reduced by eliminating some of these elements or by adding new ones that are consonant with the knowledge of the action taken.” Dissonance-increasing information can be nulli¤ed “by various means such as misperception, denying its validity, and the like.”2 Even if a choice is made in a putatively rational manner—and Festinger and his colleagues seem to think most choices are made in this fashion—postdecision thought and behavior (if dissonance is present) thus tend to be one-sided and biased.3 The degree to which an individual will seek to suppress dissonant information, as well as the speed with which this process is commenced, are in large measure determined by two crucial factors: (1) the degree to which a choice has been decided upon after an examination of alternatives (this does not, however, rule out the possibility that impulse might have something to do with the decision-making process itself), and (2) the degree of commitment to the choice eventually made.4 L beyond conventional historical explanations 123 In nineteenth-century England, there lived a noble lover of the rustic life who did not want to admit that railways existed. He made certain that, during the course of his daily peregrinations, he never ventured into areas in which, according to rumor, trains could be observed. This individual presumably died convinced that stories of unnatural, cinder-spouting machines were the products of diseased imaginations. In several World War I histories there is a famous photograph of the British royal family and other notables about to review a parade of British troops held in celebration of victory in November 1918. There on the reviewing stand is George V, his somewhat more sturdy-appearing wife (“the other four-¤fths,” as she was referred to by irreverent American soldiers), and assorted family members and ministers. Below the stand one can contemplate the members of the Imperial General Staff. Study these ¤gures closely. Any one of them could have been related to the previously mentioned nobleman. With a few notable exceptions, the British war effort between 1914 and 1918 was characterized by a seemingly perverse commitment to stale, unimaginative tactics that were responsible for slaughters that would be equaled only by those on the eastern front in World War II.5 Military minds of all countries are often not noted for breadth of imagination or subtlety. In the case of England, however, one is struck by certain persistent problems that plagued the military establishment during the First World War. This chapter examines what we think are the most prominent ones, problems that, in our opinion, cannot be explained in traditional historical terms. After considering various personalities and events, focusing in the end upon Sir Douglas Haig as representative of the basic problems involved, we will apply the cognitive dissonance hypothesis to these problems and, in the course of such, reach an overall conclusion that will be somewhat disquieting. A LONG, BLOODY ROAD At the beginning of World War I, there were some—such as Lord Horatio Kitchener, the secretary of state for war, and Douglas Haig—who realistically expected the con¶ict to be a long one. As for the British army of 1914, it was relatively small. However, despite overall problems with training, it had assimilated certain painful lessons learned during the Boer War and was probably the best in the world with regards to marksmanship.6 Committed to battle in August 1914, this army (the “Old Contemptibles”) was, along with the armies of France and Belgium, steadily pressed back by its German opponents. In numerous engagements, however—in the course of which Field Marshal Sir John French...

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