Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach

Introduction Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory

In October 2001, the U.S. decision to launch a military campaign in Afghanistan in response to the September 11 attacks by al-Qaeda unleashed a maelstrom of protest throughout the Muslim world. Despite the variegated contexts of activism and the multivocality of the demonstrations, several common patterns emerged during the early stages of the war in Afghanistan. First, many of the strongest demonstrations erupted after prayers and the Friday khutba (sermon) at mosques. In Kenya, for example, 3,000 protesters ran through the streets of Nairobi waving placards and chanting slogans after attending prayers at a mosque controlled by Shaykh Ahmed Mussallam, the chairman of the Council of Imams and Scholars (Africa News, October 13, 2001). In an episode in Jakarta after Friday prayers, 10,000 Muslims marched from the National Monument to the U.S. embassy and then ¤lled the southbound lanes of Jalan Thamrin with protesters, buses, motorcycles, and trucks (Agence France Presse, October 19, 2001). In Kuala Lumpur, 2,000 members of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) demonstrated outside the U.S. embassy after gathering for Friday prayers at a nearby mosque. Representatives of the PAS were eventually allowed into the embassy to present a note protesting the bombings in Afghanistan (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, October 12, 2001). Certainly, demonstrations took place on other days as well, but as social sites of collective action, the Friday gatherings in mosques provided opportunities for organizing contention. Second, although nonaf¤liated Muslims frequently participated in demonstrations , Islamic movement groups organized many of the protest events. Well-known Islamic organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt and Jordan), the Justice Party (Indonesia), and the Jamiat Ulama-I-Islam (Pakistan), coordinated massive protests and rallies opposed to the war in Af1 Introduction Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory Quintan Wiktorowicz ghanistan and Muslim government support for the United States. Smaller, more radical groups, such as Lashkar Mujahidin (Indonesia), also actively organized demonstrations against the U.S. bombings. Third, the demonstrations were frequently used as opportunities to articulate an indictment of U.S. foreign policy that reversed attributions of fault and reassigned de¤nitions to the terminology used by the American administration to justify its actions. In particular, America was framed as the embodiment of evil, terrorism, and injustice because of its support for Israel against the Palestinians, policy toward Iraq, and attacks that killed civilians in Afghanistan . Banners denounced the U.S. war in Afghanistan as “a crusade against Islam” (Jordan Times, October 12, 2001) and charged that “Bush is the greatest terrorist” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, October 12, 2001). Others pledged to “save the world from global terrorism [i.e., the United States]” and to “drag Bush to an international tribunal” (Agence France Presse, October 11, 2001). These slogans were accompanied by the ubiquitous “Death to America” and placards proclaiming support for Osama bin Laden. At a rally in northern Nigeria, attended by more than 3,000 Muslims, the president of the Kano State Council Ulama aptly summarized the general sentiment on the Muslim street: “America’s de¤nition of terrorism differs from the rest of the world. America is the biggest terrorist nation, given its record of unprovoked attacks on countries like Libya, Iraq, and Sudan” (Agence France Presse, October 7, 2001). Fourth, many of the protests exhibited a consistent repertoire of contention (Tilly 1978; Traugott 1995). In addition to marches and rallies intended to demonstrate opposition to the United States, protesters utilized other tools of dissent. Petitions were directed to U.S. representatives as well as to Muslim governments. Protesters unveiled banners in indigenous languages as well as English, the latter indicating a strategy to target broad audiences in the era of globalization. Symbolic props and actions were also common, especially religious idioms and burning American ®ags and ef¤gies of President George W. Bush. Violence did occur, but usually in response to protest policing techniques, which tended to be repressive. All of these forms of contention are part of what we term “Islamic activism ”—the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes. Our de¤nition of “Islamic activism” is purposefully broad and attempts to be as inclusive as possible. In doing so, it accommodates the variety of contention that frequently emerges under the banner of “Islam,” including propagation movements , terrorist groups, collective action rooted in Islamic symbols and identities , explicitly political movements that seek to establish an Islamic state, and inward-looking groups that promote Islamic spirituality through collective efforts. We believe that given the plethora of differences...