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The rise of Islamic activism among urban, educated youth in Egypt in the 1980s and early 1990s poses something of a puzzle for students of collective action. Under the shadow of Egypt’s authoritarian state, even nonviolent reformist Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood remained technically illegal and subject to surveillance and harassment by the security police. An open af¤liation with the Islamist cause entailed real risks, while the prospect of affecting positive change was at best uncertain. Yet despite such seemingly unpropitious conditions, Islamist groups in the 1980s and early 1990s did manage to attract a substantial number of the country’s bright, ambitious, and upwardly mobile university graduates. What explains the success of Islamist outreach to Egypt’s universityeducated youth? This question is best answered by addressing the broader social movement literature on the “micro-mechanisms of mobilization” (see McAdam 1988)—that is, on how movement leaders forge and sustain linkages with potential recruits. The mobilization literature contains at least two major theories of recruitment, which draw on different assumptions about the motives that drive collective action. One strand of the literature, informed by a “rational actor” model of human behavior, contends that movements attract new members by appealing to individual interests (see, e.g., Olson 1965). Movements do this by providing “selective incentives”—material, psychological , and/or emotional bene¤ts that are contingent upon participation. From this viewpoint, access to bene¤ts motivates potential participants to join a group or movement, and these bene¤ts explain their continued involvement over time. Another strand of the literature on mobilization contends that individuals Nine Interests, Ideas, and Islamist Outreach in Egypt Carrie Rosefsky Wickham 231 often join groups or movements to express deeply held commitments, values, and beliefs and are thus frequently motivated by more than narrow self-interest and a desire to obtain bene¤ts (e.g., see Laraña, Johnston, and Gus¤eld 1994). Hence movement leaders are able to mobilize individuals into politics by issuing a “call to arms” or normative rationale for collective action—a process described by Robert Benford and David Snow as “motivational framing” (2000). A movement may thus elicit participation as a response to a perceived moral duty or obligation, whether driven by “moral shock” or by deeply held values and beliefs, irrespective of the costs and bene¤ts likely to affect those involved (Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Jasper 1997). This chapter argues that both interests and ideas motivate collective action and that the relative causal weight of each can shift over time, especially as participants become increasingly integrated into movement networks. A close investigation of Islamic patterns of recruitment among high school and university graduates in three sha"bi (“popular” or urban, lower-middle-class) neighborhoods in Cairo demonstrates that while both interests and ideas help account for the success of Islamist outreach, their relative importance as motivating factors changed over time. Most graduates initially joined Islamic networks because of various social, psychological, and emotional bene¤ts conferred by participation, much as “rational actor” models of mobilization would predict. But while such bene¤ts help explain involvement in initial, low-risk forms of activism, they alone cannot explain an eventual progression to riskier, more overtly political forms of Islamic activity. To facilitate a progression toward high-risk activism, Islamists framed activism as a moral “obligation” that demands self-sacri¤ce and un®inching commitment to the cause of religious transformation. Such a frame encouraged graduates to view political participation as a religious duty. The positive reception of the Islamist message by Egypt’s educated shebab (young adults), however, was not a function of the frame’s “intrinsic” appeal. Rather, it hinged on a set of conditions external to the message itself, including (1) its close “¤t” with the life experiences and beliefs of those graduates targeted for recruitment; (2) the credibility and effectiveness of its agents and modes of transmission; and (3) its reinforcement through intensive, small-group solidarity at the grassroots level. The framing “success” helped set the groundwork for riskier political contention. Networks and Selective Incentives Many graduates ¤rst got involved in the Islamic movement by participating in social or cultural activities sponsored by a neighborhood mosque or Islamic student association. Such activities included attending religious lessons at a nearby mosque, joining an informal study group, or accompanying a friend or neighbor to special prayer services in observance of an Islamic holy day. SevCarrie Rosefsky Wickham 232 [3.135.183.89] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 13:09...

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